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Abstract 
 
Author: Dylan Davidson 
Title: Body, Mind, and Affect: Three Studies in Contemporary Animated Film 
Supervising Professors: Donna Kornhaber (English), Heather Houser (English) 
 
The complete representational freedom afforded by animation has long made it the site of 
slippages between visual strategies that prioritize “exterior” and “interior” notions of reality. 
This capacity to balance “mimetic” and “abstract” impulses harmonizes with the flexible 
methodologies recently developed by affect theory, whose investigations of disparate notions of 
“feeling” have foregrounded subjects that evade neat linguistic apprehension. This thesis argues 
that affect and animation fulfill and enrich one another, emphasizing their shared fascination 
with issues of cognition, embodiment and subjectivity. Pixar’s Inside Out (2015), Charlie 
Kaufman and Duke Johnson’s Anomalisa (2015), and Hayao Miyazaki’s Spirited Away (2001) 
substantiate these resonances, using animation’s depictive fluidity to engage with pressing 
theoretical questions: affect’s imperfect methodological rigidity, the co-constitutive “circuit” that 
commingles body and mind, and the influence of received aesthetic values on our subjective 
interpretation of affective phenomena. Together, these films demonstrate how interweaving the 
vocabularies of animation and affect provides new ways of sorting out where “feelings” come 
from and how we ought to engage with them.  
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1 
Introduction: 
Animation’s Affective Resonances 
 
After all these implements and texts designed by intellects 
So vexed to find, evidently, there’s still so much that hides. 
– The Shins 
 
* 
 Around midway through Isao Takahata’s Tale of the Princess Kaguya (2013), the film 
momentarily falls apart. Kaguya, a beautiful young princess from the moon who is discovered 
and raised by Japanese peasant farmers, cracks beneath the pressure to conform to traditional 
gender roles. Unwilling to remove her eyebrows, to blacken her teeth, to sit motionless at the feet 
of her wealthy suitors, she runs away from home. She charges across a monochromatic 
landscape, shedding the half-dozen brightly colored kimonos she wore out of deference to her 
parents, racing at breakneck speed toward the woods. 
The film keeps pace with the sprinting princess—but only just barely. The “camera” 
follows a jagged path alongside her, mimicking the bumpy and frequently chaotic motions of 
handheld live-action cinematography. Meanwhile, as Kaguya presses further into the woods, the 
images themselves begin to break down: Kaguya is rendered as a pair of red and black smudges 
that suggest the image of a running girl, while the landscape around her becomes rough and 
sketchy (fig. 1). Tree trunks and shadows are represented by rugged horizontal scribbles, and 
sharp vertical brushstrokes indicate stalks of tall grass. Takahata’s decision to go “outside the 
lines” in this sequence neatly metaphorizes Kaguya’s break with the stifling formality of her 
unrequested lifestyle, but it also heightens the emotional impact of her decision to run away. The 
chaotic motion of Kaguya’s inky surroundings, the dissolving lines of her own body, the rawness 
and urgency of forms breaking down into shaggy, storyboard-like sketches—these exterior 
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details reflect Kaguya’s interior landscape. The film transposes the subjective feeling of her 
flight onto the observable forms of the world around her. 
  
Figs. 1 & 2: Princess Kaguya’s stylistic breakdown 
As the fast pace and ragged energy of its changing style suggest, the breakdown sequence 
is the emotional climax of Takahata’s film, a breaking point in Kaguya’s internal struggle to 
cope with the pressure of her parents’ overbearing expectations. In a moment of narrative crisis, 
the fraying rawness of her interior state transposes itself onto the film’s images. Emotions, 
Kaguya demonstrates, have a way of making their way from “inside” our minds “out” into the 
world, of coloring our perceptions of and responses to our external circumstances. But recent 
scholarship on the subject has also emphasized how emotion—or rather affect—can move in the 
other direction: from the “outside” “in.” 
To this end, entire schools of theory and philosophy have cropped up around the idea of 
“reclaiming” the body, long designated as at best ancillary and at worst a distraction to the 
rational mind, for its critical productivity. Theorists such as Brian Massumi have picked through 
the dense writings of philosophers like Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze, arriving at the 
idea that affect, an ineffable, dispositional dimension of being-in-the-world, must be thought to 
reside in the body, the real site of our interactions with the objects, forces, intensities and flows 
that constitute the world around us. All of this vocabularizing (words like “intensity,” “flow,” 
and even “object” have all taken on new and very specific meanings in recent scholarship) has 
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given affect theory a steep and occasionally frustrating learning curve. But it also demonstrates 
how reconsidering the links between body and mind has provided the groundwork for a new and 
rapidly expanding branch of criticism. 
Since the mid-1990s, affect theories have proliferated widely—and are by no means 
unified in their aims and principles.1 Generally speaking, the major break has been between two 
camps: cognitivists and corporealists. The former group argues that it’s possible to integrate 
affect and the body into the critical conversation while maintaining a certain “inside-out 
directionality.”2 These writings are often based on the work of psychologists like Silvan Tomkins 
and Paul Ekman, who followed in Darwin’s footsteps in looking at observable physiological 
behaviors to determine how interior states are expressed (literally “pressed out”).3 Cognitivists 
look for the mechanisms that propel emotion’s “inside-out” movement; as Tomkins put it, 
“Darwin [in studying facial cues to determine subjects’ emotional states] thought there was 
something being expressed. What he saw wasn’t it.”4 
 Corporealists, on the other hand, tend to take a body-first approach that either rejects or is 
unconcerned with the mind’s ability to comprehend or express the experiences of the senses. In 
Massumi’s view, the categorical emotions (joy, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise) that 
Darwin enumerated in The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (and which were later 
reformulated by Silvan Tomkins) are only the knotted outcroppings of affects that “double over” 
                                                
1 Alexa Weik von Mossner identifies and outlines phenomenological, cognitivist, political, and audience-
response perspectives. See Moving Environments: Affect, Emotion, Ecology, and Film (Waterloo, ON: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2014), 6-8. 
 
2 Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” in The Affect Theory Reader 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 6. 
 
3 See Tomkins, Affect Imagery Consciousness, 4 vols. (New York: Springer, 1962-92), and Ekman, 
Emotion in the Human Face (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1972). 
 
4 Silvan Tomkins, “Inverse Archaeology: Facial Affect and the Interfaces of Scripts Within and Between 
Persons,” in Exploring Affect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 285. 
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themselves and rise to the surface level of linguistic apprehension.5 That is, while some affects 
accrue enough complexity and immediacy that we can identify them with language, these are 
hardly the only embodied phenomena that arise out of our interactions with the world. As card-
carrying poststructuralists, theorists like Massumi tend to emphasize the underlying 
philosophical principles that motivate their claims: “The aim [in focusing on the body],” 
Massumi writes, “was to put matter unmediatedly back into cultural materialism, along with 
what seemed most directly corporeal back into the body.”6 Massumi’s use of the prepositional 
phrase “back into” illustrates how he sees the fluidity of bodily affect as a way to reaffirm his 
commitment to materialism. 
It’s all a bit baroque, but the vigorous debate among theorists who fit under the broad 
umbrella of “affect” shows how quickly a critical interest in “feelings” opens up into a lively and 
at times dizzyingly complex theoretical discourse—one that seems to encompass everything, that 
is unnerving in its comfort with the shortcomings of language. As Eric Shouse writes, “the body 
has a grammar of its own that cannot be fully captured in language.”7 At the very least, affect 
theorists’ propensity to level bold claims like Shouse’s demonstrate its capacity to shake up old 
conversations. It’s contemporary. It’s exciting. Affect is where the action is. And as we’ll see, 
it’s where animation has been all along. 
* 
If the shifting forms in Kaguya’s breakdown sequence hinted at the directional 
ambiguities that motivate ongoing discussions in affect theory, they also demonstrate key 
representational compromises inherent to animation. In one sense, the scene’s gradual 
                                                
5 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual (Durham, NC: 2002), 31. Hereafter designated PV. 
 
6 Ibid., 4. 
 
7 Eric Shouse, “Feeling, Emotion, Affect,” in M/C Journal 8.6 (2005). 
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decomposition of the frame presents a microcosm of a decades-long transition in its director’s 
visual style. After the meticulous realism of his neorealist masterpiece Grave of the Fireflies 
(1988), Takahata started to experiment: whereas before this period he used diegetic justifications 
like a dark tunnel to narrow the frame and direct the viewer’s eye (fig. 3), with 1991’s Only 
Yesterday Takahata began to strip away details throughout the frame to create daringly spare and 
minimalistic compositions (fig. 4). Two decades later, Tale of the Princess Kaguya continues this 
pattern; in the style of traditional Japanese prints, the film is full of blank space, modest charcoal 
linework, and restrained watercolors. 
  
Fig. 3: Grave of the Fireflies, and Fig. 4: Only Yesterday 
 Takahata’s changing visual style (across both his career and the scene from Kaguya) 
demonstrates two of animation’s defining qualities: malleability and selectivity. Though theorists 
have only recently given serious, straight-faced attention to the medium, every animation scholar 
worth his salt is familiar with Sergei Eisenstein’s concept of “plasmaticness.” Eisenstein was 
delighted with the “rubber hose” quality of the characters in Walt Disney’s Silly Symphonies 
cartoons, noting in characteristically heady prose how their flexible bodies “[allow] 
representational forms to behave as a non-volitional play of free lines and surfaces.”8 That is, 
                                                
8 Sergei Eisenstein, Eisenstein on Disney, ed. Jay Leyda, (London: Heinemann, 1989), 99. Scott 
Bukatman suggests that “all scholarly articles on animation are required to cite this work” (he’s right). 
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“representational forms” like a cartoon skeleton’s limbs can be as flexible and “playful” as an 
animator wishes—she can make the film’s “free lines and surfaces” do whatever she likes. 
 In the writings of animation scholars since Eisenstein, “plasmaticness” has come to 
represent animation’s complete representational freedom and its fundamental affinity for change; 
an animator can draw (or sculpt, or program) whatever she wants into the frame—anything at all. 
Animation theorist Paul Wells makes much of this total control of the screen space inherent to 
animation, arguing that 
animation’s very language collapses structural fixities and known frameworks, and 
fundamentally is especially responsive to, and expressive of, change. More than any other 
means of creative expression animation embodies a simultaneity of (creatively) re-
constructing the order of things at the very moment of critically deconstructing them.9 
 
Wells’ emphasis on simultaneity and his bold claims about the “very language” of animation are 
characteristic of his work to reclaim the medium as a high art form deserving of serious critical 
inquiry: “Animation,” he writes, “is the very language of the Modernist principle,” of the 
imperative to stretch our representational capacity and “make it new.”10 Wells is without doubt 
the most authoritative voice in contemporary animation scholarship. In particular, his book 
Animation and America (2002) lays out a comprehensive history, vocabulary, and theory of 
animation, structuring the conversation for recent scholars like Ursula Heise, Scott Bukatman, 
and Karen Beckman—over a decade before animation caught their eyes. 
With Wells’ assertion of animation’s malleable mise en scène (i.e., the freedom to 
manipulate literally everything in the frame) arises the medium’s second defining characteristic: 
an imperative to make representational decisions that constrain this visual limitlessness. Because 
                                                
9 Paul Wells, Animation and America (Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 16-17. Hereafter 
designated AA. 
 
10 Ibid. 
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nothing in an animated film draws itself, every diegetic element must be a deliberate choice. As 
Maureen Furniss writes, animators continually place themselves along a continuum between 
“mimesis” and “abstraction.”11 Furniss neatly captures how animation allows artists to create 
images that approximate “reality” as we experience it as well as more expressionistic 
renderings—as in The Tale of the Princess Kaguya—that visualize how something feels. As 
we’ll see, mimesis and abstraction aren’t mutually exclusive categories, but it’s useful to think of 
a push and pull between different visual commitments: on the one hand animation’s capacity to 
approximate recognizable forms, and on the other its ability to transmute those forms into 
something subjective and interior. 
So while it’s not a zero-sum relationship, animators (particularly those who make 
narrative films) often sacrifice the abstract capacity of the medium in favor of creating 
recognizable and viewer-friendly forms. This tradeoff is evident in Kaguya’s breakdown 
sequence, whose brief expressionism is particularly effective precisely because it appears to 
threaten the stability of the film itself. As I’ll show in my chapter on Inside Out, animators often 
pragmatically circumscribe the medium’s plasmatic potential in order to maintain a stylistic 
consistency that enables their films to be about something in a way that a wide audience can 
understand. Likewise, abstract animators who veer from mimesis often sacrifice narrative 
potential in the name of representing complex and very particular interior processes and feelings. 
Stan Brakhage’s Eye Myth (1957) illustrates these tradeoffs, foregrounding animation’s 
fixation with the relay between internal and external realities. Eye Myth is a nine-second-long 
silent film, which famously took Brakhage a year to complete; he painted every image directly 
onto all 216 frames of sixteen-millimeter celluloid. The film is a rapid wash of multicolored 
abstract paintings, grouped roughly by shape and hue (the first second is mostly gold and orange 
                                                
11 Maureen Furniss, Animation Aesthetics: Art in Motion (London: John Libbey, 1998), 6. 
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images, followed by a flood of green and blue and black, and so forth). Aside from a few fleeting 
images that resemble human figures, there’s very little in the way of mimesis: there’s no 
traditional narrative, no characters, no clearly articulated thesis. 
  
Figs. 5 & 6: Humanlike forms in Brakhage’s Eye Myth 
Rather, to the extent that Eye Myth can be interpreted, it thrusts this task upon the viewer; 
its fleeting moments of representational continuity highlight our need to “make sense” of the 
film. By directing our attention to our own turning gears, Brakhage defamiliarizes and de-
automates the cognitive process, reducing ordered perceptions to their sensory data and pointing 
our focus to the site of our interaction with the world (in this case, our eyes) and forcing us to 
observe our own interpretive machinery. So if the film is “about” anything, it may well be about 
the experience of watching it. Abstract animation frequently requires this sort of tentative 
interpretive language, in which we talk about what a film “may” mean, “if” it means anything at 
all. To be frank, experimental animation’s tendency to deny convenient interpretive footholds is 
probably why almost nobody watches it.12 But films like Brakhage’s Eye Myth usefully 
demonstrate the slipperiness of forms that hew toward a-linguistic or interior truths—a potential 
that, as Kaguya demonstrates, is always latent in an animated film. 
Regardless of what Eye Myth is or isn’t “about,” it at least demonstrates animation’s 
capacity to map out the relationship between the senses and the mind. Brakhage’s brief, non-
                                                
12 There are also, of course, economic factors. These films don’t come out of studios with a vested interest 
in turning a profit. 
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narrative flood of colors and shapes highlights the notion that “experience” is a joint effort 
between the physical process of sensation and the cognitive process of perception. With this in 
mind, Eye Myth’s particular balance between mimesis and abstraction might represent some 
intermediary place in the body-mind “circuit” (a concept I’ll be exploring in my chapter on 
Anomalisa) where raw optical data hasn’t quite been structured into a recognizable image. This 
interpretation is (necessarily, as we’ve seen) a bit conjectural, but it demonstrates animation’s 
unique ability to situate itself on an axis between external and internal “truths”; that is, between 
truth to form and truth to feeling. As Wells sees it, this potential for stylistic shifts enables 
animation to “captur[e] the oscillation between interior and exterior states.”13 As I’ll discuss in 
subsequent chapters, this “oscillatory” quality is another key feature of animation—one that puts 
a foot in the door for the same kinds of questions that motivate affect theorists. 
Brakhage’s expressionistic depiction of a half-processed perception (an “eye myth”) 
exemplifies the “in-between” quality that is at once afforded and necessitated by animation’s 
complete visual freedom. This capacity to shift between depictive strategies resonates with the 
peculiar methodology of a great deal of affect theory, which thrives in rarefied “bloom-spaces” 
that complicate clean divisions between sensation, cognition, and emotion.14 In their bird’s-eye-
view summary of affect theory, Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth use this term to describe 
places where once-overlooked interstices between rigid elements of discourse expand or 
“bloom” into sites of surprising critical productivity. But “bloom space” might also describe the 
plasmatic world of animation itself, a place where the relationship between “inside” and “out” is 
as malleable as an animator’s capacity to think up an image. 
                                                
13 Wells, AA, 7. 
 
14 Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” in The Affect Theory Reader 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press), 9. 
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For both animators and affect theorists, then, ambiguities and blurred boundaries are an 
asset, rather than a hindrance. By Gregg and Seigworth’s account, “a great many theories of 
affect do not sweat the construction of any elaborate step-by-step methodology much at all, but 
rather come to fret the presentation or the style of presentation, the style of being present, more 
than anything else.”15 Like animators’ freedom to shift between visual commitments through 
conscious acts of stylistic circumscription, affect methodology frequently entails knowingly 
“trying on” imperfect or inconcrete perspectives as a way of engaging subjects that resist rigid 
intellectual taxonomies and demand a certain “style of being present.” In this sense, animation 
and affect share a propensity for knowingly “dipping into” provisional concepts and strategies. In 
Eye Myth, for example, the rapid flow of abstract images coalesces for fractions of a second 
around a pair of silhouettes. 
  
Figs. 7 & 8: Momentary linework in Robert Breer’s Fuji 
But this methodological push and pull is perhaps best exemplified by the work of 
experimental animator Robert Breer, who spent half a century exploring the mechanisms of 
continuity and perception that mediate our experience of cinema. Breer’s method of 
“abstraction” is to pull apart the concrete components of his films, separating outlines, shapes 
and colors into diegetic elements that behave of their own accord. Breer veers toward reduction, 
using a bare minimum of occasional detail to suggest ordered, recognizable forms among his 
                                                
15 Ibid., 14. 
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abstract images. In Fuji (1974), for example, he depicts the view from the window of a train in 
Japan with a shifting style that only sporadically uses lines (figs. 7 & 8). The eponymous 
mountain fluctuates from a distinct image of a specific place in time to a blend of shapes and 
colors that suggests something more subjective. Punctuating abstraction with mimesis, Breer 
uses animation’s capacity to dip into a more structured visual strategy in order to guide the 
viewer’s perception of the images—and also, occasionally, to take away the guard rail. 
* 
Animation and affect resonate in their spectacular resistance to structural rigidities. As 
the fluctuating visual strategies of Isao Takahata, Stan Brakhage and Robert Breer demonstrate, 
animation’s defining formal features—its complete representational freedom as well as the 
consequent imperative to constrain that freedom—align it with the mindfully tentative 
methodologies of theorists who investigate the ambiguous origins and functions of “feeling.” 
Undeterred by the potentially ineffable implications of their investigations into matters of 
cognition, embodiment and subjectivity, affect scholars have devised new and deliberately 
inconcrete strategies for textual analysis, and in doing so have challenged the utility of 
concreteness in the first place. This thesis argues they have also inadvertently created a 
vocabulary to describe what animation has been doing all along. 
In my three studies of contemporary animated films, I’ll show how the emerging 
disciplines of affect theory and animation studies fulfill and enrich one another, allowing us to 
think about structure-defying questions of embodiment, subjectivity, and feeling in new ways. 
Existing scholarship has yet to call attention to these homologies: no one has yet pointed out in 
contemporary theoretical terms just how animation connects disparate notions of “feeling” that 
involve the mind and the body; nor has any scholar recognized the way that animation fulfills 
12 
Massumi’s call for forms that “part company with the linguistic model [...] and find a semiotics 
willing to engage with continuity.”16 As Wells might say, animation is the “very language” of 
continuity, not just as a temporally extended art form, but in its constant rearticulation of its own 
formal fluidity and potential for transformation. Viewing animation through the lens of affect 
theory lends new significance to animation’s propensity for change, yielding productive insights 
into age-old questions about the relationship between body, mind and emotion: Where do 
“feelings” come from? How do they color and/or constitute our understanding of the world? And 
how can we incorporate this knowledge into our day-to-day lives? Likewise, animation visually 
instantiates concepts that affect theorists have been describing for decades, and has the potential 
to change the way we conceptualize “feeling” and “thinking” and the connections between them. 
In this introduction, I’ve argued for the validity of intermingling affect theory and 
animation studies by illustrating their “resonant” fixations with questions of embodiment and 
subjectivity and feeling. Across the three extended analyses that make up the rest of the thesis, 
I’ll demonstrate how animation plays out these resonances while commenting on and at times 
correcting the shortcomings of different approaches to affect. 
Pixar’s Inside Out (2015) exemplifies the tradeoff between mimesis and abstraction, 
demonstrating the way that animators adopt stylistic constraints in the name of narrative clarity. 
By visualizing the “inside” of the mind using color-coded characters and visual motifs of 
construction and industry, Inside Out takes a decidedly cognitivist approach to affect, relegating 
the body to an ill-defined space below the head. Yet the film also anticipates its critics by 
narrativizing a challenge to its own structure-bound approach, ultimately accounting for its 
conceptual shortcomings by self-consciously adjusting its structuring principles. In this way, 
                                                
16 Massumi, PV, 4. 
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Inside Out demonstrates the value of provisional or “attenuable” strategies for theorizing and 
representing affect. 
Charlie Kaufman and Duke Johnson’s stop-motion film Anomalisa (2015) offers a 
counterpoint to Inside Out’s tentative engagement with the body. Through cinematographic 
slippages between subjective and objective perspectives, the film visualizes the conceptual 
ambiguities that motivate scholarship on affect and demonstrates the negative consequences of 
solipsistic residence in the head. By muddying the distinction between third- and first-person 
points of view and foregrounding the inherent artificiality of its own stop-motion technique, 
Anomalisa demonstrates animation’s capacity to complicate clean divisions between interior and 
exterior, illustrating the theoretical and interpersonal imperative for an affective “circuit” in 
which body and mind meet and blend. 
Finally, Hayao Miyazaki’s hand-drawn anime masterpiece Spirited Away (2001) builds 
on Anomalisa’s assertion of the importance of materiality, revealing how sensory engagements 
and the affects they generate are codified by received aesthetic values. Through its narrative of 
personal empowerment in the face of aesthetically inflected fear and disgust, Spirited Away 
critiques aesthetic theories that link physical excesses and moral failings and points toward an 
interpretive paradigm with a more positive and theoretically sound view of the body and the 
innumerable forms it takes. 
Together, these films demonstrate the utility and thrill of intermingling the vocabularies 
of affect and animation. In their own ways, they build on the homologies I have demonstrated 
here, illustrating the necessity of corporeal engagement in understanding and experiencing affect. 
By reconciling and interlacing disparate notions of “feeling,” they point to new ways of thinking 
about bodies and cognition and feelings both in cinematic texts and in our own lives.
14 
 
Mixed Emotions: 
Inside Out’s Case for Malleable Categories 
 
 After returning from a trip to Europe in 1953, Walt Disney was infuriated to discover that 
his animators had created an “experimental” film in his absence. Full of expressionistic character 
drawings and non-figurative background paintings, Toot, Whistle, Plunk and Boom used the hip, 
colorful aesthetic of modern design to create a jazzy and fast-paced history of music. The film 
was enormously well received, winning that year’s Oscar for best animated short, but Disney 
was nevertheless horrified at director Ward Kimball’s flagrant departure from the company’s 
decades-old house style. Biographer Marc Eliot writes that “Walt explicitly banned all further 
stylistic experimentation by any animator and limited Kimball’s participation in future film 
productions.”1 
 Kimball should have seen this censure coming. By that time, Disney’s vehement refusal 
to embrace the abstract forms that had entered the imagination of contemporary visual art was 
well-documented: his refusal to entertain the possibility of formal experimentation had led to the 
formation of UPA, a production company made up largely of animators who had left Disney 
Studios during a strike in 1941. Beginning around 1950, UPA became a serious competitor for 
the Academy Award for Best Animated Short Film—and in fact, Kimball’s win in 1953 was the 
first time a Disney film had been awarded the prize since the studio’s 1942 propaganda film Der 
Fuehrer’s Face [sic]. Nevertheless, Disney persisted in demanding an essentially realist style of 
his animators through the 1950s and 60s, an imperative that has persisted throughout the studio’s 
history. In the twenty-first century, Disney’s photorealist legacy has been delicately and 
                                                
1 Marc Eliot, Walt Disney: Hollywood’s Dark Prince (London: Andre Deutsch, 1994), 218. 
15 
innovatively preserved by the animators at Pixar Studios. In their collaborative, industrial 
approach to the medium, Pixar mimics Disney’s story-first approach, which since the 1930s has 
divided artistic authorship across dozens or even hundreds of individual laborers. 
All of this emphasis on realism makes Inside Out (2015) an oddity for Pixar. While many 
of their films offer fantastic and imaginative worlds, they all essentially behave, in a sense, like 
the one that we live in: toys come to life, Monsters work in factories, anthropomorphized 
vehicles drive themselves around racetracks. Inside Out travels inside the mind, adopting a visual 
style predicated almost entirely on metaphor to represent the emotional developments of an 
eleven-year-old girl whose family moves to San Francisco from her Midwestern hometown. 
As I argued in my introduction, animation’s limitless visual capacity, as well as the 
imperative to adopt strategies that constrain it, align the medium with the deliberately tentative 
critical mode of affect theory. Pixar’s approach to representing consciousness in Inside Out 
exemplifies these necessary tradeoffs, using animation’s pliability to create a system of crisp, 
intuitive visual metaphors at the cost of the medium’s more expressionistic capacities. This 
emphasis on structures and categories, along with the film’s distinct separation between “Inside” 
and “Out,” aligns it with dualistic, cognitivist theories of affect that formulate the mind as a 
“headquarters” that processes the body’s ancillary sensory experiences. But Inside Out girds 
itself against criticism on these terms by incorporating the shortcomings of its own categorical 
structures into its narrative, suggesting a big-picture perspective that values adaptability over the 
specific dictates of any individual paradigm for understanding emotion. 
Inside Out is as much a film about rules as it is about feelings. Its narrative, right from the 
moment of its protagonist’s birth, comprises a spectacular yet methodical enunciation of the 
principles that structure the film’s diegesis. The movie begins with a slow fade into a shot of a 
16 
newborn Riley blinking awake in her parents’ arms, atop a voiceover asking, “Do you ever look 
at someone and wonder, what is going on inside their head?” Shallow-focused and drenched in 
soft white light, the opening image is an impressionistic—if nevertheless photorealistic—
representation of the first moments of human life (fig. 1). 
  
Fig. 1: The opening shot of Riley, and Fig. 2: Joy and Sadness operate Riley’s “controls” early in the film 
But the opening shot doesn’t linger. The moment Riley opens her eyes, the camera zooms 
at a rapid pace through what is presumably her optical nerve (visualized as a rapid tunnel-like 
procession of blue lights), to a dark, evaporative space. In the middle of the frame, a yellow light 
glows with increasing intensity as a brightly colored figure materializes. She blinks awake, 
echoing Riley’s expression from moments before, and begins to walk forward. She sees Riley’s 
parents on an enormous “screen” that floats in the vaguely defined space above her head. 
Looking back down at her feet, Joy discovers a white panel with an enormous button; when she 
presses it, Riley laughs. Immediately the camera pulls back through Riley’s eyes to the Outside 
world, creating an artificial match-cut from a shot of Joy at the “control panel” to a shot of Riley 
giggling in her parents’ arms. 
As is the case for many of Pixar’s frequently high-concept films, Inside Out’s inventive 
opening sequence self-consciously takes on the task of articulating the basis parameters of its 
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world.2 First and foremost, its alternating narrative principle establishes the “Inside” and 
“Outside” realms that will simultaneously constitute Riley’s experience—a dualistic, parallel 
structure that serves as the bedrock for the rest of the story. In the Outside world, Riley interacts 
with her parents, goes to school, plays hockey, and otherwise lives her life; Inside, a team of 
Emotions3 operates the “control panel” that modulates her reactions to her external 
circumstances. 
The first time Riley cries, Joy looks away from the screen to discover a short blue 
character at the control panel: Sadness (fig. 2). When Riley’s parents try to feed her a forkful of 
broccoli, Disgust takes the controls and makes her turn away with revulsion. When they threaten 
to take away her dessert, Anger steps in. The Emotions’ use of a control panel illustrates how the 
title “Inside Out” identifies both the film’s central narrative conceit and its theory of how affect 
determines the relations between subject and world: literally “at the controls,” Riley’s feelings 
illustrate the “outward movement” denoted by the etymology of the word “emotion.”4 The 
Emotions internally process Riley’s material circumstances, and their reactions are transposed to 
the Outside world through the mechanistic operation of her body. Gregg and Seigworth identify 
this perspective in their taxonomy of affect theories as as one which views emotion as “the prime 
‘interest’ motivator that comes to put the drive in bodily drives.”5 
                                                
2 Think of the opening “town hall” that gets cut short at the beginning Toy Story, forcing the characters to 
“play dead” on the floor of Andy’s room; or the in medias res “scaring” sequence of Monsters, Inc., in 
which a diffident monster-in-training tries and fails to frighten an animatronic child. 
 
3 Capitalized here and throughout to distinguish the film’s characters from “emotions” writ-large. 
 
4 “emotion, n.” OED Online. December 2016. Oxford University Press. From Latin e-movere, literally “to 
move outward.” 
 
5 Gregg and Seigworth, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” 6. My italics. Gregg and Seigworth themselves 
contrast this kind of theory from the body-first ideas of Deleuze and Massumi on account of “a certain 
inside-out/outside-in difference in directionality” (ibid). 
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If Inside emotions “drive” the cognitive processes that determine Riley’s Outside 
interactions with and reactions to the world, it makes sense that the film imagines their control 
room as the central “Headquarters” for an enormous structure of memory and personality that 
develops outward as Riley grows and matures. The opening sequence goes on to show how each 
interaction between an emotion and the outside world produces a glowing orb—a memory—that 
rolls along a pair of rails into the mind’s machinery. The first time this happens, Joy watches in 
wonder as a gold ball containing an image of Riley’s parents rolls out from beside the “screen” 
and into a series of brightly-colored gears and whirligigs that instantly materialize out of the 
dark, undifferentiated space of her infant mind. 
The film’s Rube Goldberg-esque memory system is the first instance of a series of 
mechanical and architectural metaphors, images of structuring that outline the basic principles of 
Inside Out’s use of the medium. As Riley grows older, the Inside space of her mind develops 
into a sprawling network of buildings and infrastructures. Her personality is represented by a 
handful of “islands,” floating factories that churn mechanistically on the horizon, while her 
“memory archive” is maintained by hard-hatted, east-coast-accented workers who use vacuum-
operated machines to dispose of old experiences and send pertinent ones to the head (fig. 3). All 
the while, a literal “train of thought” snakes through the sky, transporting information throughout 
the mind. 
If part of the aim of the film is, as Joy suggests in her opening voiceover, to explain 
“what is going on inside [someone’s] head”—that is, to show how the mind works—Inside Out’s 
emphasis on processes of production resonates with its self-conscious effort to enunciate its own 
rules. To this end, the film is full of lighthearted industrial metaphors that explain the origins of 
thoughts and behaviors, like a mischievous memory worker who explains how he likes to send a 
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catchy commercial jingle up to headquarters “for no reason” as a way to make his job more 
interesting. This playful didacticism is the primary mode of the “structuring” sequences that 
comprise the opening of the film, and the engine of its effort to transplant emotion from the 
film’s subtext to its diegesis. 
If part of the film’s project is a didactic translation of abstract concepts into concrete and 
comprehensible images, metaphor predictably plays a fundamental role in its visual logic. Facts 
and opinions are represented as near-indistinguishable mahjong tiles. An overzealous lick of ice 
cream envelops the control room in a sheet of ice—a literal “brain freeze.” But the most crucial 
example is the film’s character design, which links shape, size, gesture, and color symbolism to 
represent emotions with a neat system of visual shorthand. Joy is tall and yellow, constantly 
smiling, and twirls around Riley’s head making suggestions while she directs the other 
Emotions. Sadness, by contrast, is short, blue and rounded; she shuffles from place to place and 
moves indecisively. Anger is stout, angular and red; he moves in short, jerky strides and blows 
fire from the top of his head when angry. Fear is purple, skinny, and skittish; Disgust green, 
dismissive, fashionably dressed. These characters code the film by shape and color, particularly 
sequences involving the “memory orbs” that they produce when they take control of Riley’s 
mind. For all of Riley’s childhood, the color-coded Inside characters sort out Riley’s 
experiences, hoping to produces as many yellow (joyful) orbs as possible; in this sense, the 
Emotions themselves use the film’s visual shorthand as a way of processing and assessing the 
quality of Riley’s life—a measure of how well they’re “doing their job”—a job that is placed 
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under new and unfamiliar stresses when Riley’s family moves from her childhood home in 
Minnesota to San Francisco.6 
Inside Out’s didactic impulse, its motifs of mechanization and productivity, and its crisp 
structures of visual metaphor all demonstrate the filmmakers’ use of animation for ordering and 
heuristic-building. This emphasis on comprehensibility contrasts Paul Wells’ account of the 
chaotic, destabilizing potential of the medium. Whereas Inside Out seeks to elucidate the rules 
and structuring principles of the mind, Wells tellingly titles the introduction to Animation in 
America “Abdicating All Mental Law,” arguing that animation’s defining feature is its ability “to 
question and challenge the received knowledges which govern the physical laws and normative 
socio-cultural orthodoxies of the ‘real world.’”7 Inside Out does just the opposite, metaphorizing 
the “workings” of the mind using the forms of the observable world; though the film’s ultimate 
goal is to show how emotions make their way from the “inside” “out,” it does so by bringing 
representational structures—like trains, factories, and control panels—from the “outside” “in.” In 
this way, it presents “the fragmentary processes of ‘thought’ itself” as not fragmentary at all, but 
rather as whole, completed, and unified.8 
Wells would not be surprised at Pixar’s use of this visual strategy. Just after the release of 
Monsters, Inc. (2001), he wrote that the studio’s trademark style “heighten[s] the sense of 
realism until the form does not ‘announce’ itself as animation but insists upon its representational 
validity”; in other words, the studio’s efforts have largely reflected the cutting edge of digital 
                                                
6 As I’ll discuss later in the chapter, the film never really articulates how a non-joy emotion can 
simultaneously be committed to reacting to external circumstances and making sure Joy gets as much 
time at the controls as possible. 
 
7 Wells, AA, 5. My italics. 
 
8 Ibid., 7. 
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animation’s potential to replicate “real life.”9 In 1995, computer-animated characters’ skin 
looked like plastic, so Pixar made a film about toys. Since then, the sequence of their films has 
tended to reflect the studio’s developing capacity to make things “look good”: plastic (Toy 
Story), insect carapaces (A Bug’s Life), a monster’s fur (Monsters, Inc.), fish scales (Finding 
Nemo), and so on. Today, digital animation software often includes an artificial “camera” that 
filmmakers can program in deliberately analog terms: aperture, shutter speed, panning, tilting, et 
cetera.10 
This sequential use of individual films as technological experiments with the ultimate 
goal of photorealism echoes Walt Disney’s efforts throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s to 
make hand-drawn cartoons behave as closely as possible to films shot in live action. Casey Riffel 
points out how three key technologies contributed to this goal: the cel technique, which allowed 
animators to zero in on individual body parts to create realistic motion; Steamboat Willy’s use of 
sound synchronization, which made cartoons a truly audiovisual spectacle; and The Old Mill’s 
use of the multiplane camera, a photography rig that allowed animators to more accurately 
approximate three-dimensional space. These developments, Riffel argues, enabled the practice of 
“full animation,” which Disney imbued with an “ideology of realism.”11 Wells, too, documents 
this process, arguing that Disney’s strides toward photorealism and his keen market sensibility 
created a “Disney Effect” by which animation came to signify, in the popular imagination, a 
staid depiction of fantastical events rather than anything irreverent, chaotic, or abstract: “Disney 
                                                
9 Paul Wells, Animation: Genre and Authorship (London: Wallflower, 2002), 13. 
 
10 Pixar is understandably protective of the specifics of their software, which they refer to as 
“Marionette.” But one imagines, based on credits in their films for roles like “camera direction” and 
“lighting direction,” that it follows a live-action-modeled formula. See Finding Dory (2016). 
 
11 Casey Riffel, “Dissecting Bambi: Multiplanar Photography, the Cel Technique, and the Flowering of 
Full Animation,” in The Velvet Light Trap 69 (Spring 2012), 3. 
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made animation a credible art-form, but simultaneously veiled the capacity of the form to more 
readily exhibit its subversive credentials.”12 
A crucial component of this development, in Wells’ account, was the way that Disney’s 
Fordist production system diffused artistic authorship across an “assembly line” of individual 
animators. Time and market demands required (and still require) multiple artists to work on 
various aspects of a film simultaneously: traditional roles include “key” animators, “in-
betweeners,” colorists, and background painters—not to mention writers, directors, producers 
and studio executives. In this sense, Disney’s industrial model “denies the specificity of 
authorship and ideological coherence.”13 
Pixar’s rigid story-first  production model arguably continues this tradition of necessary 
fragmentation; according to the studio’s co-founder and current president Ed Catmull, each film 
goes through dozens of revisions with a “braintrust” of directors and screenwriters who refine the 
script and storyboards for years before animation begins.14 And just as the traditional animation 
process requires an assembly of various skills and expertises, the digital animation process 
necessitates experts in character design, compositing, camera, rigging, and shading—roles which 
often require specialization in separate pieces of software. It makes sense, then, for a film like 
Inside Out to visualize the mind as a complex system of interlaced productive infrastructures, to 
celebrate collaboration and the diffusion of individual control. So while Pixar follows in 
Disney’s footsteps in adhering to “a model of animation which only partially use[s] its graphic 
                                                
12 Wells, AA, 45. 
 
13 Ibid., 42. Although this isn’t to say that there’s no “author” of a Disney film. Wells goes on to argue in 
Animation: Genre and Authorship that Disney’s enormous influence as producer—an effective marshaller 
and marketer of creative elements—allowed him to develop a distinctive signature. As it were. 
 
14 Ed Catmull. “Inside the Pixar Braintrust.” Fast Company. March 12, 2014. 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3027135/lessons-learned/inside-the-pixar-braintrust. 
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potential,” it offers up in exchange a kind of heuristic spectacle, a system of visual categories and 
metaphor structures that promises to operate like a fine-tuned machine.15 
  
Fig. 3: Riley’s “personality islands,” and Fig. 4: A memory displayed on the “screen” of her visual field 
 The film’s structuring and category-making storytelling strategy, inflected by the 
collaborative effort required to unify its fragmentary production process, places considerable 
importance on vision. As the brief “optical tunnel” shots in the opening sequence demonstrates, 
the film theorizes Riley’s eyes as the primary point of contact between the Outside and Inside 
worlds, the “screen” through which the Emotions “experience” the events of her life. Throughout 
the film, Inside characters use the idiom of the cinema to talk about the relation between Riley’s 
experiences and their role in the process of cognition (fig. 4); when Riley falls asleep, a team of 
bean-shaped filmmakers begin shooting at “Dream Productions,” a colorful reconstruction of a 
Hollywood sound stage. The dead-eyed director shouts at her crew members, “Remember, play 
to the camera, people. Riley is the camera.” Tongue-in-cheek as the line may be, it is also a 
succinct description of the way the film theorizes the relation between “Inside” and “Out”; other 
than the occasional “brain freeze” joke, the film almost entirely neglects the senses of touch, 
                                                
15 Wells, Animation: Genre and Authorship, 9. 
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smell, taste, and sound. Like Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus, Riley’s life seems to consist mostly of 
“thought through [her] eyes.”16 
In this sense, Inside Out takes advantage of a centuries-old theoretical alignment between 
thought and sight. In her reclamation of the oral, tactile affect of disgust, Brinkema sardonically 
writes that “unlike the category-making, truth-approaching sense of vision, smell and taste are 
dismissed as senses that cannot discriminate or produce knowledge about the world.”17 It was 
this rejection of the “lower” senses, far from the head and associated with the body’s boundaries 
and extremities, that necessitated an affective and aesthetic category predicated on the rejection 
of corporeal excess and the exclusion of intolerable forms.18 Diatribes aside, Brinkema’s point 
about the dismissal of the bodily senses calls attention to the fact that there doesn’t seem to be 
much room for the non-visual (or the more-than-visual) in Inside Out’s meticulously color-coded 
interior world. 
Brinkema’s problematization of cognitivist aesthetic paradigms that privilege vision 
above the other senses makes for a pretty simple critique of Inside Out’s categorical approach to 
affect.19 Because the film lacks a robust depiction of the function of the skin, the readers of 
Massumi might argue, its representational strategy falls short of accounting for affect’s pre-
cognitive “autonomy.” I’ll return to this line of thinking at the end of this chapter, but for the 
moment I’d like to consider the film’s conceptual “shortcomings” as necessary consequences of 
its decision to theorize affect in the first place—an example of how, as I argued in the 
                                                
16 James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Vintage, 1934), 37. 
 
17 Brinkema, FA, 121. 
 
18 A notion I’ll be investigating with a great deal more scrutiny in my chapter on Spirited Away. 
 
19 And it fits right in with the host of recent methodologies that formulate affect as “that which eludes and 
is opposed to capital-T theory’s ________-centric tendencies.” 
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introduction, both animation and affect theory are not constrained but rather defined by mindful 
acts of self-limitation and thematic circumscription. 
Resisting the instinct toward an interrogatory or “paranoid” reading of Inside Out’s 
categorical system reveals a subtle malleability in its adherence to the theoretical principles that 
inform it. The idea of a finite number of “basic emotions” is probably as old as categories 
themselves, but Inside Out’s formulation closely follows the system outlined by Darwin in The 
Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) and refined a century later by psychologist 
Paul Ekman in Emotion in the Human Face (1972). Both scientists based their theories on 
interpreting and categorizing facial expressions; they measured eyebrow angles, facial muscle 
contractions, the visibility of teeth. The outside-in “close reading” methodology of Darwin and 
Ekman, reading external forms as clues for cognitive structures, underscores their faith in the 
“interest motivator” theory of affect in which internal emotions are “ex-pressed” in response to a 
subject’s physical circumstances. In the four decades since Ekman’s book, he has become a 
leading figure in the psychology of emotion—to such an extent that Inside Out’s director Pete 
Docter sought him out for consultation on the script.20 Docter clearly retains the most essential 
elements of Ekman’s theory: the basic emotional categories of Joy, Sadness, Fear, Anger, and 
Disgust.21 But his film also follows one of Ekman’s more implicit premises—a system of spatial 
relations built on a clear distinction between “Inside” and “Out” in the first place. 
This spatial separation, illustrated primarily by Inside Out’s back-and-forth editing 
strategy, literalizes Wells’ idea that animation “captures the oscillation between interior and 
                                                
20 Dacher Keltner and Paul Ekman. “The Science Behind Inside Out.” The New York Times. July 3, 2015. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/opinion/sunday/the-science-of-inside-out.html. 
 
21 Ekman writes that his sixth basic emotion, surprise, was left out because Pixar’s braintrust determined 
that the story could only “handle” the five characters that made it into the script (ibid.). 
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exterior states.”22 Wells often writes about animation in terms that emphasize its balance of 
multiple synchronous representational functions: it is both “extrapolated from, and interpretive 
of, observational and representational codings,”23 and it “embodies a simultaneity of (creatively) 
re-constructing the order of things at the very moment of critically de-constructing them.”24 For 
all of Wells’ emphasis on animation’s synchronous “both/and” qualities, his description of 
animation’s “oscillation” between Inside and Out foregrounds how easily “either/or” binarisms 
can come to inform spatial metaphors of subjecthood—a mode of representation that pretty 
neatly describes Inside Out’s visual strategy. 
Wells would certainly contest this binaristic reading of his “oscillation” principle,25 but I 
think it’s a useful illustration of how Inside Out’s alternating story structure allows the film to 
play out in two places, at the expense of any coextensive space or action. For while the film is 
built on the premise that both the Inside and Outside narratives are happening “at once,” the 
film’s representational strategy precludes a simultaneous depiction of both worlds; the film only 
deviates from this back-and-forth editing principle during a handful of scenes in which the 
Emotions watch Riley’s experiences on a screen, effectively reducing their agency to that of a 
passive observer. 
This spatial and narrative separation between Inside and Outside is a defining 
characteristic of the film’s use of animation. While the film depicts everything that happens in 
Riley’s external life using Pixar’s standard quasi-live-action cinematography, it reserves a freer 
                                                
22 Wells, AA, 7. 
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 Ibid., 17. 
 
25 That is, he would oppose a stringent focus on the word’s “either/or” implications, and argue that this 
oscillation constitutes, rather than hinders, the mechanism of animation’s simultaneous functions. 
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and more blatantly cartoonal vocabulary for interior passages; the effort to visualize Riley’s 
mind allows Pixar’s animators much more liberty in creating an abstract and plasmatic world. 
Before Inside Out, Pixar’s only foray into what might be called “abstract” animation was a pair 
of shots in Brad Bird’s Ratatouille (2007) in which the taste of food is visualized as swirling 
colors against a black background—and this effort was outsourced to a Canadian traditional 
animator.26 
But going “Inside” allows Pixar’s animators to “play up” their use of plasmatic forms, 
albeit in a strictly demarcated context. There is certainly precedent for this approach: in 1992’s 
Aladdin, the Genie’s magic gave Disney’s animators a narrative justification to modulate the 
realistic “house style” and call upon the medium’s cartoonal possibilities.27 The Genie’s 
introductory “Friend Like Me” sequence is full of instances of the “metamorphosis, synecdoche, 
and condensation” for their own sake that Wells sees as the medium’s defining characteristics.28 
In one tellingly absurd shot, the Genie’s face turns into a caricature of Jack Nicholson (fig. 5). 
The significance of this sequence is not so much the cartoon image of Nicholson as the 
representational freedom that it implies; the image, like many of the Genie’s other 
transformations, was likely the result of the studio’s uncharacteristically lenient decision to allow 
Robin Williams to ad-lib a number of his lines.29 
                                                
26 Michel Gagné. “Taste Visualization for Pixar’s Ratatouille.” Gagne International. 2007. 
http://www.gagneint.com/Final%20site/Animation/Pixar/Ratatouille.htm. 
 
27 There is probably a whole essay to be written about this film’s complicated and flexible relationship 
with Disney realism and the broader history of American animation; I am indebted to an in-class lecture 
by Donna Kornhaber for this observation. 
 
28 Wells, AA, 13. 
 
29 Diamond in the Rough: The Making of Aladdin [Aladdin Platinum Edition, Disc 2]. (Burbank, CA: 
Disney Home Video, 2004), DVD. 
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This playful yet essentially constrained ad libitum sensibility also characterizes Inside 
Out’s approach to the visual distinction between its interior and exterior worlds. Though its 
imagery and metaphor structures are guided, as I argue, by recognizable external forms, the 
film’s play with shape, color and character design nevertheless represents a clear modulation of 
the “stylized realism” that defines the studio’s visual strategy. Still, just as the formal freedom of 
Aladdin requires and is ultimately delimited by the narrative conceit of magic, Inside Out 
marshals its more experimental visual passages with clear formal and narrative boundaries. 
  
Fig. 5: Aladdin’s Genie transforms into Jack Nicholson, and Fig. 6: “Deconstructive fragmentation” 
The clearest example of the film’s “constrained freedom” is the sequence when Joy, 
Sadness and Riley’s childhood imaginary friend Bing Bong visit the “abstract thought” section 
of Riley’s mind. Keeping with the industrial motif of the film’s metaphor system, the outside of 
Abstract Thought is depicted as an enormous warehouse, covered with metallic tubes and 
surrounded by machinery. Inside, however, is an enormous white room that expands in all 
directions and is filled with floating geometric shapes. In an abrupt change of animation style 
prompted by a mind-worker’s decision to “turn on” Abstract Thought, Joy, Sadness and Bing 
Bong are transformed into cubistic three-dimensional structures that only vaguely retain the 
shapes of their original bodies. Sadness announces that she has “read about this in the manual,” 
and that the first step of abstraction is “non-objective fragmentation” (fig. 6). Frightened by their 
sudden transfiguration, they immediately make for the exit. 
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But as they run toward the door, they are simplified even further, along lines that neatly 
correspond with animation’s expressionistic capacities: in the “deconstruction” phase, the 
components of their bodies break apart and fall onto the floor; in the next phase, the screen 
literally compresses into a line down the middle of the frame and rotates, revealing a flat version 
of the three characters (fig. 7). Observing their second transformation, Sadness exclaims “Oh no! 
We’re two dimensional!” and exhorts her companions to “get out of here before we’re nothing 
but shape and color.” Just before they make it through the door, they are transformed into 
nonfigurative shapes: Joy a yellow star-shaped polygon, Sadness a blue oval, and Bing Bong a 
curved pink triangle (fig. 8). 
  
Fig. 7: The “two-dimensional” phase of Abstract Thought, and Fig. 8: The “nonfigurative” phase 
The sequence is as playful and tongue-in-cheek as any of the film’s other metaphoric 
vignettes (“Depth! I’m lacking depth!” Bing Bong shouts), but its meta-breakdown of the 
representational capacities of different animation styles reveals a sly self-awareness to Pixar’s 
strategy for representing cognition. Though deconstructed, nonfigurative representations of 
interior processes are certainly possible, the chaos of the sequence suggests that Pixar’s visual 
storytellers perceive a tense relationship between narrative and abstraction—Sadness explains, 
significantly, that if they stray too far from their original forms, they will be “stuck [as 
nonfigurative shapes] forever.” 
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If Inside Out formulates abstraction (both visual and cognitive) as a source of corporeal 
and narrative disintegration, its compartmentalization safeguards the film against the most 
dangerous possibilities of the medium. The monochromatic industrial facade of the Abstract 
Thought building distinguishes it sharply from the rainbow-colored world around it. Throughout 
Riley’s mind, even the most overtly mechanistic images are softened by smooth curves and 
friendly faces, but Abstract Thought is all business; the squat structure sports exposed pipes, 
thick metal doors, and a sign reading “DANGER: KEEP OUT.” The film’s dysphemistic 
imagery and efforts to literally “wall in” a less concrete visual language illustrates how it is 
possible for a medium defined in part by an irreverent “destabilization of received knowledge” to 
relinquish that capacity in the name of structuring and simplification.30 After briefly considering 
the alternative, Inside Out’s return to categories is quick and wholehearted. 
* 
Thus far I’ve argued that Inside Out is defined by a dualistic narrative and visual strategy 
predicated on a spatial separation between cognitive and bodily experiences. It formalizes the 
interactions between these two through visual metaphors of mechanization, aligning the film 
with “interest motivator” theories of affect which assert the primacy of cognition over physical 
processes. The film’s metaphorizing and category-making visual mode illustrates its use of 
animation for organization and structuring, a preference that reflects its industrial production 
process and the strong link between vision and cognition that undergirds categorical affect 
systems. Though there are clear shortcomings to both categorical theories and a rule-bound 
approach to animation, the film’s meta-analysis of its own use of the medium demonstrates that 
its visual strategy is a deliberate act of formal circumscription in the name of narrative and 
theoretical coherence. 
                                                
30 Wells, AA, 17. 
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Until this point, then, the film has basically been an enterprise in demonstrating the 
benefits of categories, through its charming and intuitive acts of metaphorization, its “spectacle 
of organization,” and its brief comparisons to more fluid representational paradigms. But the film 
also anticipates the shortcomings of its categorical approach; for one thing, a number of crucial 
elements of the film are literally rough around the edges. When Joy appears for the first time, the 
“screen” of Riley’s vision is blurred and hairlike at the edges, and every Emotion has fuzzy, 
cotton-ball-like skin. The fuzzy, unclear boundaries of Inside Out’s Emotions, on the one hand a 
formally innovative strategy for demonstrating their immaterial “cognitiveness,” also provide a 
convenient correlative to Gregg and Seigworth’s observation that contemporary theories of 
emotion tend to formulate bodies as “defined not by an outer skin-envelope or other surface 
boundary but by their potential to reciprocate or co-participate in the passages of affect.”31 This 
isn’t to say that the film is at all invested in the loose Deleuzian principles that motivate lenient 
definitions of embodiment, but the Emotions’ hazy “skin” at least acknowledges (in formal 
terms) the significance of the “thresholds and tensions, blends and blurs” that complicate neatly 
constructed categories (fig. 9).32 
More significantly, though, the film’s narrative anticipates and accounts for the flaws of 
categorization writ-large by visualizing a crisis in Riley’s family life as a disruption to the 
structural motifs at the foundation of its visual language. After an early montage of Riley’s 
childhood, the film settles into the frame story: her family’s move to San Francisco. A 
characteristically efficient piece of screenwriting, the montage serves the dual function of 
demonstrating how the Emotions’ “control panel” works and showing the viewer a handful of 
important memories that Riley is leaving behind: her childhood home, her friends, her hockey 
                                                
31 Gregg and Seigworth, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” 2. 
 
32 Ibid., 4. 
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team. Joy hints at possible dysfunction during her voiceover at the beginning of the film, while 
describing the roles of each of the Emotions. Fear is “really good at keeping Riley safe,” 
Disgust’s job is to “keep Riley from being poisoned,” and Anger “cares very deeply about things 
being fair”—but Joy glosses euphemistically over her inability to find a place for Sadness: “I’ve 
checked,” she says. “There’s no place for her to go. So, she’s good. We’re good. It’s all great.” 
  
Fig. 9: Anger’s hazy skin, and Fig. 10: Goofball Island collapses into the “memory dump” 
Riley’s arrival in San Francisco provides the first challenges to the Emotions’ task of 
keeping Joy at the forefront of her conscious experience: her house is old and dilapidated, her 
parents are stressed, the pizza is made with broccoli, and she has trouble fitting in at school. 
Inside Riley’s head, the Emotions struggle to come up with coping strategies like starting up an 
ersatz hockey game with a broom, imagining the possible arrangement of her new bedroom, and 
“replaying” happy memories from Riley’s childhood in Minnesota. But all of these efforts fail: 
Riley’s father gets a phone call, interrupting the hockey game; the movers get lost, postponing 
the furniture’s arrival; and finally, the happy memories are interrupted by Sadness, who finds 
herself inexplicably compelled to touch the memory orb as it floats in the mind’s “projector,” 
changing its color-coding from gold to blue. 
This strange impulse to transform happy memories into sad ones is what sets the film’s 
Inside narrative in motion. After Sadness re-colors a “core memory,” Joy tries to prevent the orb 
from being sucked into the pneumatic machine that will catalog it as a part of Riley’s 
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personality; in the ensuing struggle, both Joy and Sadness are pulled out of Headquarters and 
deposited in the far-off archives of memory. Seeing Headquarters in the distance, Joy and 
Sadness quickly realize that if they don’t make it back in time, Riley will be incapable of feeling 
happiness at all. 
Riley’s attempts to process the stresses of her new life without a full set of emotions 
quickly takes its toll on the Inside world. When her father, seeing that she is discouraged and 
unhappy, attempts to cheer her up by pretending to be a monkey (an important childhood 
memory), Anger, Fear and Disgust are unable to elicit the proper reaction from the control panel. 
Through the window, they watch as the gears and machines on “Goofball Island” stop working; 
the factory grows dim and static, then collapses into the canyon below (fig. 10). One by one, the 
other factories—Hockey Island, Friendship Island, Family Island—stop functioning and fall into 
the abyss. Frustrated and depressed, Riley decides to run away. 
If the film metaphorizes the benefits of a categorical approach to affect using motifs of 
architecture and structuration, its images of demolition brought on by overwhelming Outside 
circumstances underscore the danger of assuming that such a system is airtight and 
comprehensive. In his “Argument for Basic Emotions,” Ekman meticulously lays out nine 
biological prerequisites for what he sees as the most fundamental emotional categories, including 
“distinctive universal signals,” “comprehensible expressions in other animals,” and “universal 
antecedent events.”33 Ekman’s empirical impulse, apparent in his emphasis on “distinct” and 
“universal” phenomena, shares a certain taxonomic rigidity with Inside Out’s categorical 
structure at the beginning of the film, a system in which everything—excluding Sadness—fits 
right into its proper place. And though Ekman acknowledges the existence of “other affective 
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phenomena” (i.e., those that do not fulfill his nine biological prerequisites), he states that “it 
should be clear by now that I do not allow for ‘non-basic’ emotions.”34 
Though Inside Out basically holds to Ekman’s guiding principles, it challenges the 
rigidity of his empirical approach. At the start of the film, Riley’s “basic emotions” consist of 
Joy, Anger, Fear, and Disgust—if each Emotion is defined in terms of its function, Sadness is 
decidedly not a part of the mind’s fine-tuned cognitive system. But what Joy attempts to cast as a 
minor flaw in the film’s categorical system (at one point she attempts to fix it by literally 
circumscribing Sadness in a chalk circle while the other emotions do their jobs) is revealed to be 
an enormous and destructive foundational instability. And just as animation helps the film 
organize abstract concepts into intuitive and comprehensible structures of categories and visual 
metaphors, in the second half its capacity for destabilization helps to problematize this approach.  
As they try and fail to use the mind’s crumbling structures to get back to Headquarters, 
then, Joy and Sadness are themselves subjected to the shortcomings of the film’s imperfect 
rules—and to the fluidity of the medium as a whole. For if animation is, as Wells argues, 
“fundamentally [...] responsive to, and expressive of, change,” it is perhaps as well equipped to 
represent the fluctuations of a visual strategy as it is to construct one in the first place.35 
Inside Out’s sequences of diegetic collapse—and the Emotions’ attempts to process 
them—are part of a long history of metacinematic tensions between character and world in 
animated films. In films like Dave Fleischer’s Bimbo’s Initiation (1931) and Chuck Jones’ Duck 
Amuck (1953), the anything-goes fluidity of the animated diegesis threatens the stability of 
characters’ understanding of the world. In Fleischer’s surreal and Kafkaesque film, Betty Boop’s 
canine friend Bimbo finds himself trapped in the labyrinthine headquarters of a secret society; 
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trapdoors open up in solid stone floors and shadowy figures pass through walls as Bimbo 
simultaneously tries to comprehend and escape from his frightful surroundings (fig. 11). In 
Jones’ film, Daffy Duck gets into an argument with an antagonistic animator, who repeatedly 
changes the visual parameters of the film—the background, the color scheme, even Daffy’s 
body—without warning (fig. 12). 
  
Fig. 11: Fleischer’s Bimbo’s Initiation, and Fig. 12: Jones’ Duck Amuck 
In both of these films, the inherent instability of animation’s plasmatic world plays out at 
the expense of the characters who inhabit it. As Ursula Heise writes, these sorts of structural 
changes at the hands of unknown forces “insinuate that agency and subjecthood might be 
questions of perspective rather than essence.”36 And while Inside Out’s sequences of categorical 
collapse don’t go so far as to question the basic subjectivity of Joy and Sadness, they certainly 
offer a corrective to the “interest motivator” theory predicated on the Emotions’ autonomous 
control over Riley’s body. In this sense, the film simultaneously illustrates the flaws of a 
taxonomizing, cognitivist system to both the characters and the viewer. 
Ultimately, the plot’s resolution—and the successful reconstruction of Riley’s mind—
relies on a newfound malleability to the film’s structuring principles. After Joy “rewinds” a 
happy memory and discovers that a moment of comfort in Riley’s childhood (being tossed in the 
air by her parents and her hockey team) was actually precipitated by an outward display of 
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discouragement (defeat in an important game), she has a realization: “Mom and Dad came to 
help because of Sadness.” She devises a strategy to get back to headquarters,37 then allows 
Sadness to operate the control panel for the first time. To get Riley to return home, Sadness turns 
a handful of “core memories” from gold to blue, prompting Riley to turn back and seek the 
comfort of her family. After a cathartic reconciliation with her parents, a multicolored memory 
orb rolls out from behind Riley’s “screen”—half blue, half gold. The film wraps up quickly after 
this scene, with a montage depicting her new, better-adjusted life. A mind worker installs a new, 
updated control panel with more buttons, a new set of personality islands fills the horizon, and 
the “core memory” panel in the center of the room is filled with multicolored orbs: red and gold, 
purple and green, blue and red. 
By incorporating the problems with its visual strategy into a new and improved set of 
visual “rules,” Inside Out demonstrates the utility of a malleable commitment to not-quite-
perfect body of theory. By acknowledging of the validity (and the insistence) of experiences that 
push back against the neat demarcations of its color-coded visual shorthand, the film engages 
with a broader question of the utility of the utility of theoretical “structures” in the first place. In 
this sense, the significance of the blue-gold orb is not so much that colors can blend as that 
systems can bend to incorporate experiences or concepts that exceed their purview. 
This emphasis on the flexibility of its visual strategy illustrates Inside Out’s resonance 
with Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s principle of “attenuated adherence” to imperfect theory. 
In their landmark essay “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins,” Sedgwick 
and Frank argue that while anyone with even an introductory knowledge of theory might “make 
mincemeat” of Tomkins’ categorical affect theory (which bears a number of similarities to 
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Ekman’s),38 his peculiar writing style nevertheless prompts a crucial investigation of certain 
reflexive critical suspicions.39 
Though Tomkins’ assertion of nine irreducible, biological categories of feeling inevitably 
sets off critical alarm bells with its implicit adherence to the universalizing, “conversation-
stopping word innate,” Sedgwick and Frank argue that this adherence “proves a spectacularly 
attenuable one.”40 Foregrounding Tomkins’ method and motivations rather than the end result of 
his theory, they admit that “at some level we have not demanded even of ourselves [...] whether 
we believe this [categorical] hypothesis to be true.”41 In this way, Sedgwick and Frank exemplify 
Gregg and Seigworth’s assertion that much of affect theory is about “the stretching of process 
underway, not position taken.”42 
Like Sedgwick and Frank’s argument for reading Silvan Tomkins, Inside Out is an 
argument for a critical imagination beyond the parameters of theory rather than a suspicious 
fixation with its blurry borders. Critiquing the strange theoretical dualism that they argue 
emerges from a reflexive suspicion of knowledge systems with “finitely many (n>2) values,” 
Sedgwick and Frank use the analogy of “a scanner or copier that can reproduce any work of art 
in 256,000 shades of gray. However infinitesimally subtle its discriminations may be, there are 
crucial knowledges it simply cannot transmit unless it is equipped to deal with the coarsely 
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reductive possibility that red is different from yellow is different again from blue.”43 Inside Out’s 
transition from color-coding to color-blending is just one example of the advantages of working 
within an imperfect but fundamentally malleable system, a gesture toward the possibility of 
future adjustments. In this way, the film subtly asserts its categorical visual strategy as a 
provisional, rather than rigid, representational apparatus. 
Inside Out exemplifies the cinema of “spectacular attenuation.” While its dualistic 
narrative structure and categorical visual language may point toward a problematic cognitivist 
understanding of affect, the film nevertheless uses the structuring and destructuring capacities of 
animation to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the “interest motivator” theory of body-
mind relations that undergirds its narrative and visual logics. By diegetically integrating its own 
conceptual shortcomings, Inside Out engages with and accounts for the challenges posed by 
experiences that transgress color-coded boundaries, exemplifying the benefits of “attenuated 
adherence” to flawed but well-intentioned bodies of scholarship—an attenuation made possible 
by the unique adaptive capacities of animation. 
* 
Still, the film’s acknowledgement of the general category of “theoretical shortcomings” 
hardly constitutes a detailed engagement with its conceptual flaws. While Inside Out effectively 
illustrates the resonances between affect’s and animation’s affinities for shifting strategies and 
flexible frameworks—and provides a basis for a quasi-categorical perspective I will occasionally 
lean on in my next two chapters—it also presents a handful of what Sedgwick and Frank 
(perhaps somewhat generously) term “sites of productive opacity.”44 That is, it raises and does 
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not answer a number of questions that I will take up in my examinations of Charlie Kaufman and 
Duke Johnson’s Anomalisa and Hayao Miyazaki’s Spirited Away. 
 For one thing, the film’s entirely audiovisual approach—which implicitly affirms that the 
only experiences relevant to cognitive judgment are those that can be projected onto a screen—
essentially neglects the body as a site of affective phenomena. I have argued that Inside Out 
codifies this cognitivist paradigm through its links between vision and thought as well as the 
spatial separation implied by its back-and-forth story structure; but the film’s images of 
verticality also illustrate its apprehensive view of the space below the head. The canyon beneath 
Headquarters and the personality islands is not a path to the body but rather an abyss, oblivion. 
Like the chaos of the Abstract Thought sequence, the film demarcates the space below the head 
as an area of physical and narrative danger: “If we fall,” Sadness says, “we’ll be forgotten 
forever.” The dread surrounding the “memory dump” reflects what Gregg and Seigworth identify 
as a feeling of “methodological and conceptual free fall” in affect theories that stray too far from 
comfortable categories, “letting themselves get lost in an overabundance of swarming, sliding 
differences.”45 These conveniently overlapping notions of “falling” reflect the importance of the 
motif of verticality in theorizing cognition in relation to the body: Massumi formulates affect as 
“function-meaning interloops that travel vertical path between head and heart,”46 while Bakhtin 
imagines a series of “strata,” between the material world of the body and the isolation of the 
individual mind.47 But whereas body-centric theories like Massumi’s and Bakhtin’s thrive in the 
loose alinguistic (or prelinguistic) mode that accompanies a move away from the head, Inside 
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Out conceives it as a threat to narrative stability, a place where one “falls” and never comes 
back. 
In the second half of my thesis, I’ll be diving deliberately into these spaces, examining 
first how animation is equipped to elide the representational gaps between sensation and 
cognition, between affect and emotion, between subject and world. Anomalisa demonstrates both 
animation’s capacity and the theoretical imperative to incorporate sensory experiences into the 
affective “circuit,” underscoring the importance of co-constitutive physiological and 
psychological processes in generating positive affect through the example of a protagonist who 
gets the balance horribly wrong. 
Inside Out’s second major “opacity” is its ambiguous sense of the Emotions’ agency. 
Though they “drive” Riley’s body by manipulating her cognitive control panel, the status of their 
autonomy is ultimately unclear. Sadness, for example, is unable explain what motivates her to 
touch the memory orb as it floats in the projector at the beginning of the film. In my chapter on 
Spirited Away, I explore how received value systems codify the aesthetic judgments that inflect 
affective responses, arguing that theoretical priorities based on the exclusion of “disattendable” 
forms are themselves sources of negative affect. 
*
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All in the Head: 
Anomalisa’s Affective Anaesthesia 
 
In one of the comedic set-pieces of Charlie Kaufman and Spike Jonze’s Being John 
Malkovich (1999), the film’s protagonist (Craig Schwartz, an out-of-work puppeteer forced to 
busk on the streets of New York) performs a sexually suggestive puppet show based on the 
romance of Abelard and Heloise. Atop a soundtrack of tinny opera music played on a nearby 
boombox, the pre-recorded voices of Schwartz and his girlfriend, voice-acting the separated 
French lovers, confess the depths of their sexual desire: “Sometimes,” Heloise says, “my 
thoughts are betrayed by the movement of my body.” Abelard responds: “I took my fill of my 
wretched pleasures in you, and this was the sum total of my love.” The puppets begin to gyrate, 
pressing their bodies against pieces of furniture (fig. 1). Unbeknownst to Schwartz, a five-year-
old girl has stopped to watch, drawn in by the novelty of the puppet show. When the girl’s father 
notices what she’s looking at, he punches Schwartz in the face. 
Later in the film, Schwartz will discover a mysterious portal that leads to the inside of 
John Malkovich’s head, granting him control over the actor’s body. Using his newfound powers, 
Schwartz vicariously lives out his professional ambitions and sexual fantasies through his 
charming and charismatic persona, making Malkovich a world-famous puppeteer. Being John 
Malkovich’s fascination with the head—particularly its ability to control the physical 
circumstances of the body—is a recurring theme in Kaufman’s scripts. In the Michel Gondry-
directed film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), a man attempts to process a painful 
breakup by paying a team of neuroscientists to remove his memories of the relationship, only to 
change his mind as the memory machine forces him to rapidly relive his experiences. In 
Kaufman’s directorial debut Synecdoche, New York (2008), a death-obsessed playwright 
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attempts to forestall the decay of his body by creating a one-to-one scale replica of his life. In 
each of these films, the mind becomes a kind of mise en abyme, an apparently endless labyrinth 
where characters seek refuge from the difficult realities of the world around them. 
 
Fig. 1: Abelard and Heloise’s sexual frustration in Being John Malkovich. 
Kaufman’s second directorial effort, 2015’s Anomalisa, marks a departure from his string 
of films about characters lost in byzantine mazes of self-analysis. A stop-motion animated film 
about a depressed customer service expert who suffers from the delusion that everyone in the 
world looks and sounds identical, Anomalisa takes a new approach to the motif of “being stuck 
in one’s head.” Rather than conceiving of the mind as a spatially distinct location in the manner 
of Being John Malkovich or Eternal Sunshine—or indeed of Inside Out—Anomalisa visualizes 
Michael Stone’s solipsism by blurring the boundary between his subjective perceptions and the 
film’s objective depictions of the world. 
If Inside Out gestures toward the importance of embodied experience by depicting the 
structural shortcomings of its cognitivist guiding principles, it does little to illustrate how 
physiological processes fit into the mind-body circuit that generates (and constitutes) affect. 
As media-theorist-turned-affect-theorist Richard Grusin sees it, we ought to think of the 
“mediation” of the senses “as the process, action, or event that generates or provides the 
conditions for the emergence of subjects and objects, for the individuation of entities within the 
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world.”1 By this paradigm, Pixar’s clean division between Inside and Out could not even exist 
without the physiological processes that “individuate” subjects. 
 Grusin’s approach to affect, a smart twenty-first century revision of his thesis that 
mediation constitutes, rather than hinders, our interactions with the world, reflects his awareness 
of recent critical focus on the oftentimes porous boundaries of subjecthood.2 As Heather Houser 
writes, “humans and the more-than-human world do not only interact but, more importantly, are 
co-constitutive.”3 Houser’s formulation is in the context of her argument about the shared 
consequences of human and environmental “illnesses,” but it neatly illustrates Anomalisa’s 
perspectivally ambiguous strategy for critiquing its protagonist’s solipsistic worldview. Stuck in 
his head, Michael Stone’s life is “anaesthetic,” cut off from his corporeal senses—leaving his 
overworked mind to fill in the gaps. 
Through its cinematographic tricks as well as its visual and narrative motifs of emptiness, 
Anomalisa devises a mise en scène that is at once depictive (as an objective photographic 
representation) and constitutive (as a subjective perception) of Michael’s isolation. In this way, 
the film’s use of stop-motion puppetry to objectify and dehumanize its characters simultaneously 
emphasizes and exacerbates Michael’s isolation, illustrating the consequences of an imbalance 
between body and mind. 
The first of the film’s cinematographic “slippages” occurs in its opening images. Fading 
in from a black frame, an airplane emerges from a bank of clouds in an extreme-long shot, 
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against the sound of several intermingling conversations.4 This is traditionally designated an 
establishing shot—a far-off, third-person-perspective image that either zooms or cuts to a closer 
shot in which characters can be introduced. By this paradigm, we would expect the film to flow 
inward, perhaps cutting to a shot of the protagonist looking contemplatively through his window, 
or flipping through an in-flight magazine. 
 
  
Fig. 2: Anomalisa’s perspectivally ambiguous opening shot. 
But having established the expectation that the first scene of the film will be set aboard 
the onscreen plane, Anomalisa quickly turns counterclassical, reversing the traditional flow of 
continuity editing by zooming out. Among the mingling offscreen voices, someone says “Hey, 
ma, look, an airplane.” While the line seems at first like an innocuous, childlike observation, it 
immediately begs an important question: Where are the voices coming from, if not from aboard 
the plane? The film provides an answer as the shot zooms further out. A frame appears at the 
edges of the screen, and it gradually becomes clear that the opening image was in fact the view 
from the window of another plane (fig. 2). Finally, the film pulls back to a medium shot of 
Michael looking through his window, revealing that the opening shot had been from his point of 
view—not an objective, third-person establishing shot, but a first-person perspectival shot. 
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The most salient feature of this opening is probably the “gotcha” effect of subverting 
traditional storytelling grammar. There are a number of such moments in the film, in which the 
camera performs an “impossible” move that disrupts the illusion of cinematographic realism; in a 
dream sequence later in the film, for example, Michael looks at a doorway in a first-person 
perspectival shot. After a beat, he emerges through the same door, heading straight toward the 
camera. These destabilizing moments rely on and disrupt stop-motion animation’s illusion of 
“reality,” foregrounding the way that the objects in the frame are simultaneously “real” (i.e., 
photographed with a camera) and artificial (i.e., all of it is constructed by the filmmakers). 
Shots like Anomalisa’s opening elide the gap between objective third-person and 
subjective first-person perspectives,5 suggesting from the get-go that the film will occupy some 
coextensive space between the two—and illustrating animation’s unique capacity to do so. For if 
Inside Out literalized Paul Wells’ thesis about “oscillation” between interior and exterior states, 
Anomalisa offers a more nuanced view of the interactions between them, evoking Sianne Ngai’s 
emphasis on the “affective indeterminacy” of a similarly ambiguous shot in Billy Wilder’s 
Double Indemnity.6 She argues that such slippages between first- and third-person perspectives 
complicate the distinction “between subjective and objective reality.”7 
Expanding on the perspectival ambiguity of Wilder’s cinematography, Ngai identifies in 
Herman Melville’s The Confidence Man a similarly slippery and unsatisfying “textual feeling” 
that pervades the novel without residing completely in any of its characters. Setting out to 
explore the aesthetic characteristics of critically neglected negative emotions (a category she 
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terms “ugly feelings” because of these emotions’ “non-productive” position in traditional 
aesthetic systems), Ngai digs into the long-standing ambiguity surrounding the precise “location” 
of literary tone.8 Arguing that “tone” defies concrete situation in either the text or the reader, she 
draws parallels to scholars’ use of affect to sort out similar difficulties in “distinguishing first-
person from third-person feeling, and, by extension, feeling that is contained by an identity from 
feeling that is not.9 Slipping without warning between Michael’s point of view and a broader 
narratorial perspective, Anomalisa’s cinematography presents similar difficulties in sorting out 
what elements of the frame are and are not “contained by an identity.” 
If the film’s slippery visual strategy is similar to the “textual feeling” of Melville’s novel, 
so too are the “nonfeltness” and “illegibility” of its own tone. Foregrounding what she sees as a 
sort of affective evacuation in the novel’s characters, Ngai argues that “the world of [The 
Confidence Man’s] story runs on a feeling that no one actually feels.”10 In both its visual style 
and the interactions between its characters, Anomalisa depicts a similar series of literal and 
metaphorical emptinesses. When Michael gets a cab to his hotel in Cincinnati (he has flown to 
Ohio to give a speech at a customer service convention), the film includes his entire conversation 
with the driver. In an exchange full of semi-interruptions and uncomfortable silences, they talk 
about Michael’s accent, the zoo,11 and Cincinnati chili—and just as in real life, a few minutes of 
insubstantial small talk telescopes to feel like hours. 
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The film is full of moments like these, in which a bare minimum of substance is 
expanded to fill as much space and time as possible. When Michael orders room service at his 
hotel, the desk attendant on the phone repeats his order with an absurd degree of detail: 
Michael’s succinct “I’ll have the bibb salad and the salmon” becomes “a bibb lettuce, 
Gorgonzola, prosciutto, and walnut salad [...] with honey raspberry vinaigrette dressing [...] and 
the wild-caught Copper River Alaska salmon amandine [...] with baby asparagus [...] and the 
black truffle broth.”12 The dilation of Michael’s order takes on a sense of urgency as Michael 
repeatedly attempts to break off the conversation; Michael’s slight agitation, despite (or perhaps 
because of) the conversation’s inconsequential subject matter, hints at the affective consequences 
of his inability to connect with the people around him. His insubstantial world leaves him 
emotionally unfulfilled. 
This motif of expanding emptiness permeates the film’s visual style—particularly its set 
design, the background against which Michael’s emotional crisis plays out. The film is 
dominated by shades of gold and beige, which initially convey a sense of warmth but are quickly 
linked to the drab interior of Michael’s hotel. Here the modulation of the film’s environment, 
certainly possible in a live action film, is amplified by the complete diegetic control afforded by 
animation. Everything in the film—down to the buttons on Michael’s shirt and the scroll wheel 
of his circa-2003 iPod—is constructed to convey an ordinariness that takes on an oppressive 
dimension in the peculiar diegetic space that both represents and interacts with Michael’s mind. 
And just as Anomalisa’s cinematography both mimics and contributes to Michael’s 
subjective experience, the hotel’s shallow, surface-level warmth is both a representation of 
Michael’s interior state and a catalyst for further frustration. The contrast between the 
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obsequious service of the hotel employees and the the depressingly tautological conversation 
Michael has with his wife (“So, um…what else? I mean, how’s your room?” “It’s, you know, it’s 
a room”) prompts him to try and reconnect with an old girlfriend he remembered on the plane (a 
woman named Bella), but the rendezvous at the hotel bar quickly falls apart when it becomes 
clear that she still hasn’t recovered from their breakup. 
Prompted to explain his erratic behavior (both past and present), Michael confesses that 
he thinks he “might have psychological problems,” indicating at least an oblique understanding 
that the identical faces of every other character in the film may be an illusion. He asks Bella 
repeatedly if she “changed” toward the end of their relationship, growing agitated and repeating 
himself when she doesn’t understand the question: “Like, did I change you? Did you change? 
Did anything change? Did a change occur?” When Bella rejects an invitation to his room and 
leaves the bar, Michael yells after her that he was “just trying to understand”—though, in the 
absence of a direct object, what exactly he wants to grasp remains conspicuously unspecified. 
Michael’s frustrated aporia (he doesn’t even know what he wants to know) highlights the 
elusiveness of both his own subjective emotions and the film’s affective orientation. And just as 
Anomalisa makes frequent use of the paradoxical motif of “expansive emptiness,” Ngai later 
describes affect as a similarly self-contradictory “fugitive presence attached to or hovering in the 
vicinity of words,” a feeling that both is and isn’t “there.”13 Michael’s inability to process or 
interpret the “fugitive presence” of his own emotional itself becomes a source of frustration, 
evoking a dilemma that Wendy Anne Lee identifies in another of Melville’s works: 
“Insensibility, or the Bartleby problem, [...] reaches back to the difficulty in Western philosophy 
of conceptualizing the relay between interior and exterior, feeling and action, in and across 
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bodies.”14 She argues that Melville’s inscrutable scrivener presents an interpretive crisis that 
challenges the necessity of “motion” implicit in the concept of “emotion,” writing that “the 
subject who has never moved initiates a desperate search for signs of interior motion [...] bound, 
of course, to fail.”15 The frustrating lack of substance in Michael’s perception of the hotel and the 
people around him forces him to grapple with another kind of insensibility, one arising not from 
the absence of affective “motion” but from a sheer lack of physical qualification. 
In the same manner as the hotel’s oppressive beigeness, this crisis of insensibility is both 
reflected and exacerbated by the film’s use of stop-motion to dehumanize and de-individuate its 
characters. As the ominous choir of Noonan-voiced plane passengers portended during the film’s 
opening sequence, the film’s central narrative conceit—that Michael perceives everyone else in 
the world as the same person—takes on a blandly nightmarish cast as the film progresses. Like 
the unnerving yet captivating Abelard and Heloise sequence in Being John Malkovich, Kaufman 
and Johnson’s use of stop-motion puppetry holds up the verisimilitude and artificiality of its 
images simultaneously, diving directly into the “uncanny valley” that has long hindered 
animators’ attempts to create “realistic” characters. “Not-quite-there” representations can disrupt 
viewers’ immersion in a film’s narrative—see Robert Zemeckis’ Polar Express (2004), whose 
thoroughly mixed critical reception ranged from at worst “a failed and lifeless experiment”16 to 
at best “a little creepy.”17 
                                                
14 Wendy Anne Lee, “The Scandal of Insensibility; or, The Bartleby Problem.” In PMLA 130.5 (October 
2015), 1406. 
 
15 Ibid., 1410. My italics. 
 
16 Peter Travers. “The Polar Express.” Rolling Stone. November 18, 2004. 
http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/reviews/the-polar-express-20041118. 
 
17 Roger Ebert. “The Polar Express.” Roger Ebert. November 9, 2004. 
http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/the-polar-express-2004. 
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Still, for some filmmakers the uncanny valley is an asset. In master Czech animator Jan 
Švankmajer’s Food (1992), for example, human actors are occasionally replaced with 
photorealistic clay models, which stretch unnaturally to accommodate the enormous bites they 
take while eating. Eventually, the clay models’ chests open up, revealing an intricate system of 
gears and pulleys. The unnerving effect of Švankmajer’s film relies on stop-motion’s ability to 
simultaneously objectify and mechanize its subjects, endowing insentient objects with a 
conspicuous yet eerily circumscribed “animus.” Ngai calls this paradoxical quality 
“animatedness,” arguing that it “not only returns us to the connection between the emotive and 
the mechanistic but also commingles antithetical notions of physical agency.”18 By enunciating 
the artificial process of its own creation, then, stop-motion foregrounds the objecthood of its 
subjects, continually emphasizing the fact that what Disney called animation’s “illusion of life” 
is just what the name implies—illusory.19 
Anomalisa takes stop-motion’s capacity for both verisimilitude and objectification to 
extremes rarely seen in the medium. In an interview just after the film’s release, Kaufman 
acknowledges the peculiar distancing effect of Anomalisa’s commitment to detail: “you’re 
interested because you know that there were decisions made every time he moves [...] you get 
fascinated with the choices made, and the craftsmanship that goes into it.”20 The film is full of 
hugely ambitious efforts that are disguised by their sheer mundaneness: Michael’s tiny, 
functioning belt buckle; diffused, on-set background lighting; anatomically accurate footsteps; 
                                                
18 Ngai, UF, 100. 
 
19 See Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnston, The Illusion of Life: Disney Animation (New York: Abbeville, 
1981). 
 
20 Charlie Kaufman and Tim Gray. “‘Anomalisa’: The Big Challenges of Re-Creating Life on a Small 
Scale.” Variety. December 30, 2015. https://variety.com/2015/artisans/news/anomalisa-small-scale-
challenges-1201664471. 
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the use of hundreds of 3D-printed faceplates for every imaginable facial expression and 
phoneme. “If this were a live-action movie,” Kaufman says, “we could have shot it in a week. As 
opposed to two years.”21 
  
Fig. 3: Michael’s “Fregoli delusion,” and Fig. 4: His cinematographic isolation. 
So Anomalisa undoubtedly tries very hard to look and act like a live-action film. But in 
addition to its few moments of destabilizing or impossible cinematography, the film also disrupts 
these efforts by preserving the horizontal “face lines” that are ordinarily rubbed out of stop-
motion films in postproduction (figs. 2-4).22 Likewise, Kaufman and Johnson opted not to 
normalize the colors of characters’ faceplates,23 retaining slight variations between individual 
facial expressions. So while the film may rank among the most lifelike puppet shows ever 
created, it nevertheless insistently reminds the viewer of its puppets’ lifelessness. Like 
Anomalisa’s cinematographic slips between first- and third-person perspectives, the 
dehumanization that accompanies the film’s enunciation of its own production process exists in a 
coextensive diegesis that is only ambiguously committed to narratorial objectivity. 
This ambiguity takes on enormous significance in the context of Michael’s “delusion” 
that every single character—excluding, briefly, one other person—is literally the same person. 
Perhaps the most literal interpretation of this conceit is that Michael is experiencing a “Fregoli 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Stop-motion almost always relies on a process called “replacement animation,” which uses 
prefabricated face models like the ones mentioned above. 
 
23 Another consequence of using a 3D printer that is usually an easy postproduction fix. 
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delusion,” a psychological condition whose sufferers believe that different people are in fact the 
same person in disguise. Delusion or solipsistic metaphor, the homogeneity of the film’s non-
Michael characters emphasizes their artificiality and further complicates the question of whether 
the diegesis is more faithful to Michael’s subjective experience or to the world outside of his 
mind. In either case, the film visually separates Michael from the world around him in a number 
of ways; when he arrives at the airport, for example, the deep focus of a first-person perspectival 
shot reveals the identical faces of every other person at the terminal (fig. 3). But when the film 
cuts back to Michael’s face, he is isolated by the shot’s extremely shallow focus—all of the other 
characters are indistinct smudges in the background (fig. 4). Whatever world Michael lives in, he 
lives there alone. 
* 
Thus far I’ve argued that Anomalisa makes use of cinematographic trickery to slip 
between subjective and objective perspectives, demonstrating animation’s capacity to reside in a 
co-constitutive space that muddies the distinction between the two. Michael’s illegible and 
unfulfilling affect relies on this blurring effect, in which his frustratingly bland surroundings 
simultaneously represent and contribute to his unhappiness. In this way, the film’s use of stop-
motion to foreground the artificiality of its characters—objectifying and homogenizing everyone 
Michael encounters—at once metaphorizes and exacerbates his isolation. 
All of this basically characterizes the affective resting state of the first half of the film 
that, as in my chapter on Inside Out, will be scrambled by the introduction of a narrative 
complication. Like the protagonists of Kaufman’s other films, Michael’s unhappiness emerges 
from his solipsistic residence in his own head, here a motif that is not literalized as an object in 
the text—as in Being John Malkovich’s magic portal, Adaptation’s tortuously composed and 
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dizzyingly self-reflexive screenplay, or the enormous warehouse in Synecdoche, New York that 
contains a scale replica of Caden Cotard’s entire life—but rather implied through the film’s 
ambiguous diegetic commitments. 
Michael’s attempt to bring Bella to his hotel room signals a breaking point in the heady, 
cognitive slant that characterizes much of the film’s first half. His clumsy grasp for physical 
satisfaction in the oppressively unsatisfying environment of the hotel illustrates the film’s 
linkage of cognitive and bodily affective phenomena, even if Michael himself is not conscious of 
this connection. In the rest of this chapter, I’ll show how Michael’s persistent recourse to the 
body as a means of sating and expressing his “insensible” emotional state demonstrates the relay 
between corporeal and cognitive conceptions of affect, a subject that has been the focus of much 
recent scholarship on the tricky question of the relationship between sensing, thinking and 
feeling. 
  
Fig. 5: Michael’s unsatisfying shower, and Fig. 6: His faceplate “hallucination.” 
Michael’s unsuccessful attempts to quell his emotional turmoil through sexual contact 
reflect an imbalance between the cerebral bent of the film’s cinematography (which mimics his 
own inability to “understand” himself) and the insistent physical needs of his own body. Michael 
seems incapable of giving his body what it needs, and moments of comfort are frequently 
qualified and provisional. When he takes a shower after his failed rendezvous with Bella, the 
water temperature oscillates between freezing and scalding, and he shouts at no one in particular: 
“Fuck! You! Fuck you!” (fig. 5). Physical near-misses like this suggest a “numbing” effect that 
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accompanies the objectification and mechanization of the film’s bodies through stop-motion, a 
reminder that each body is literally an insensate doll. Indeed, just before he meets Lisa for the 
first time, Michael has a “hallucination” in which he pulls off his faceplate after it begins to 
change against his will (fig. 6). Unsatisfied by his inability sort out his “insensible” depression, 
Michael’s body begins to act up, seemingly of its own accord. 
This literally deconstructive moment at once acknowledges the film’s artificiality and 
illustrates the tension between Michael’s body and his mind. With the introduction of Lisa, 
Anomalisa’s only other differentiated character (and its namesake), the film further asserts 
Michael’s need for physical fulfillment, ratcheting up the narrative chaos when it is momentarily 
granted and subsequently denied. Michael and Lisa’s short-lived affair foregrounds the urgency 
of sensory engagement described by Massumi and Buck-Morss as both a theoretical imperative 
and a necessity for subjective positive affect. 
Just as Anomalisa’s cinematography evinces Ngai’s point about perspectival slippages 
between “subjective and objective realities,” her concept of affect as a “fugitive presence” neatly 
aligns with Anomalisa’s exploration of the link between the senses and emotional satisfaction. 
For one thing, the film’s dubiously objective diegesis positions it well to link thematic questions 
of personal isolation and connection to a broader discourse on where “feelings” come from. 
Brian Massumi’s digs into this question in the context of distinguishing between affect and 
emotion in Parables for the Virtual. Describing emotion as “a subjective content, the 
sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience,” Massumi aligns affect with the 
intentionally vague concept of “intensity,” his word for the experiences of the “sensory surfaces” 
that make up the site of our interaction with the world outside our bodies.24 
                                                
24 Massumi, PV, 28, 14. 
 
55 
Presenting a study in which German TV viewers gave the perplexing response that the 
“saddest” of three short films was also the “pleasantest,” Massumi divorces the “intensity” of the 
films (their effects on the eyes, ears, etc.) from their qualificative properties (a melting snowman 
evokes death, which is sad). He argues that “the level of intensity [...] is not semantically or 
semiotically ordered. It does not fix distinctions. Instead, it vaguely but insistently connects what 
is normally indexed as separate.”25 Affect’s elusion of verbal apprehension is a kind of refrain 
throughout Parables, so much so that the “vagueness” Massumi describes in his description of 
intensity becomes an asset for his argument,26 further proof of the need “to part company with 
the linguistic model” if we want to fully understand the body’s importance in our lived 
experience.27 “The skin,” he writes, “is faster than the word.”28 
Trapped in his head, Michael experiences a tension between bodily and cognitive needs 
that mirrors Massumi’s teasing out of the distinction between emotion and affect. For one thing, 
the fact that Michael’s feelings so often escape him suggests that their origins may lie beyond the 
confines of language, literally “fugitive” in their constant evasion of his understanding. And 
Michael’s inability to articulate just what he is “trying to understand” by inviting Bella to his 
room to “speak more privately” suggests two distinct ideas about the way to improve his 
condition: bodily, through physical (that is, sexual) contact; and cognitive, by verbally working 
out what’s going on in his head. But just as the film’s foothold-denying cinematography 
complicates the balance between subjective and objective realities, the expansive emptiness of 
                                                
25 Ibid., 24. 
 
26 Indeed, Massumi writes in the volume’s introduction that “if at any point I thought of this [project] in 
terms of regaining a “concreteness” of experience, I was quickly disabused of the notion” (4). 
 
27 Ibid., 4. 
 
28 Ibid., 25. 
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Michael’s emotional experience makes it difficult to map out the cognitive and corporeal origins 
of his feelings. Whatever the case may be, it seems clear that Michael has more than 
“psychological problems.” 
Though Massumi plays at scientism with his reference to the German emotion study, he 
is deliberately vague about the actual physiological mechanisms that turn affect into 
apprehensible “sociolinguistic fixings.” By contrast, Susan Buck-Morss’ re-articulation of the 
role of the senses in her 1992 essay “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics” helps to sort out the 
etiological ambiguity of Michael’s “feelings”—a word that itself invites a great deal of debate.29 
Taking an etymologically scrupulous view of the word “aesthetics,”30 Buck-Morss argues that 
“the original field of aesthetics is not art but reality—corporeal, material nature.”31 She writes 
that the “corporeal sensorium” is “‘out front’ of the mind, encountering the world 
prelinguistically.”32 In describing the senses with the spatial prepositional phrase “out front of” 
and the temporal prefix “pre-,” Buck-Morss subtly (and pre-emptively) complicates Massumi’s 
assertion that affect is “alinguistic” by offering a more concrete picture of the relationship 
between bodily and cognitive processes. Tracing lines that Massumi will follow three years later 
in “The Autonomy of Affect,” Buck-Morss lays out a distinction between traditional theories of 
consciousness “which artificially isolat[e] human biology from its environment” and a more free-
                                                
29 “Feeling,” writes Rei Terada, “is a capacious term that connotes both [affect and emotion] I use it when 
it seems fruitful to emphasize the common ground of the physiological and the psychological.” Feeling in 
Theory, 4. 
 
30 From “ancient Greek αἰσθητικός [aisthetikos], of or relating to sense perception” (OED). 
 
31 Susan Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered,” in 
October 62 (Autumn 1992), 6. 
 
32 Ibid. 
57 
flowing body-world sensory system “decentered from the classical subject.”33 Crucially, she 
writes that “as the source of stimuli and the arena for motor response, the external world must be 
included to complete the sensory circuit.”34 
Buck-Morss’ placement of aesthetics at the corporeal boundary of subjective experience 
(a place where first- and third-person “feelings” meet and blend) puts a more pragmatic slant on 
Massumi’s “intensity” and resonates with the “blending” effect of Anomalisa’s corporeal and 
cinematographic paradoxes. Michael’s frustration with the emptiness of his surroundings and the 
inscrutability of his own emotions also corresponds neatly with Ngai’s formulation of “ugly 
feelings.” Inherently “a-cathartic,” “unproductive,” and “slippery,” Michael’s emotional state 
consistently defies his apprehension—though it certainly fulfills Ngai’s most important 
requirement: negativity. 
With all of these voices in mind, Michael’s emotional state is an ugly feeling of its own, 
an a-linguistic “anaesthesia” that preserves Buck-Morss’ emphasis on the corporeal sensorium as 
a site that simultaneously defines and stretches the boundaries of subjective experience. 
Michael’s anaesthesia corresponds closely to Ngai’s description of The Confidence Man’s 
unnerving tone: “a feeling which is perceived rather than felt and whose very nonfeltness is 
perceived.”35 Michael’s cognitive “feeling” arises from the awareness of a lack of feeling—a 
literal “senselessness” that results from a surfeit of cognition (“trying to understand”) and a 
dearth of interaction with the world outside his mind. In Anomalisa’s perspectivally ambiguous 
diegetic world, there’s little difference between Michael’s solipsistic perceptions and the reality 
extrinsic to his head; the homogeneity of the characters that fill the world of the film is the world 
                                                
33 Ibid., 13. 
 
34 Ibid., 12. 
 
35 Ngai, UF, 76. My italics. 
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of “corporeal, material nature” that completes the “sensory circuit” in Buck-Morss’ model of 
perception.36 By this paradigm, Michael’s “psychological problems,” which cause everyone 
around him to look identical, might also be deemed physical problems—what’s wrong with 
Michael’s mind is also wrong with his body: his eyes and hears, his skin, his heart. 
The film presents a potential cure for Michael’s anaesthesia with the introduction of Lisa, 
an unassuming customer-service representative who comes to Cincinnati to hear Michael’s 
speech—and the only other character in the film with a face and voice of her own. Michael 
freezes when he hears her in the hallway as he gets out of the shower, whispering “someone 
else” before throwing on his clothes and rushing out of his room to meet her; not long after this, 
he takes her to the hotel bar for drinks. Though there’s little substance to their conversation (“Oh, 
I play the Jew’s harp a little. [...] Anyway, I bought one of those, um, self-teaching… self-
teaching? Is that right? Or is it self-learning?” “The Jew’s harp is an underrated instrument.” “I 
know!”), Michael is transfixed by the sight and sound of her, and quickly invites her to his room 
for a nightcap—his second attempt of the night. He obsesses over Lisa’s particularities, 
especially the sound of her voice, which he says is “like magic.” He asks her to sing, and she 
performs a few verses of Cyndi Lauper’s “Girls Just Wanna Have Fun”; Michael is overwhelmed 
by her difference, and starts crying. Lisa, unaware of Michael’s condition (and desperate for 
affection herself), perceives his fascination as a sign of genuine connection. They proceed to get 
undressed. 
Michael’s fascination with difference and physical peculiarities in his interactions with 
Lisa—in spite of the outright vapidity of their conversations—reflects a focus on surfaces and 
superficial details that exemplifies Buck-Morss’ description of the senses as both physically and 
temporally “before” the mind. Though Michael and Lisa’s long-term prospects are dubious at 
                                                
36 Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics,” 6. 
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best, her physical differentiation at least fulfills the basic requirement of meaningful sensory 
interaction; with Lisa, Michael finally has an example of the positive corporeal affect that 
Massumi sees as the raw material for apprehensible emotion. The existence of the later requires 
the former to “travel the vertical path between head and heart.”37 Whereas Inside Out avoided the 
prelinguistic space of the body by visualizing it as an all-consuming fissure, Anomalisa uses 
animation’s oscillatory mise en scène to transpose the cognitive consequences of Michael’s 
defective mind-body circuit onto the world around him. 
Though there’s plenty to undercut the “connection” that serves as the basis for the sex 
scene that follows, its generous and straightforward cinematography underscores the film’s 
emphasis on the body as a necessary component of fulfilling affective connection. Composed 
mainly of long, unbroken wide shots of Michael and Lisa, the scene again adopts a 
counterclassical grammar by including the little collisions, false-starts and awkwardnesses 
traditionally elided by cinematic representations of sex. Michael accidentally pulls Lisa’s hair 
with his elbow; later, he hits his head on the bed’s headboard; their dialogue is clumsy and stilted 
(“You're being quiet. Is it not good?” “No, it's fine. It's good. It's, um…just a little bit more 
gentle, maybe. At first, maybe.”). 
All the while, the film matter-of-factly depicts Michael and Lisa’s unexceptional naked 
bodies (fig. 7). And where the decision to include every banal detail of a scene originally served 
to emphasize the lack of substance in Michael’s interactions, here it gives the scene an aura of 
honesty; Lisa and Michael’s lack of coordination reflects the urgency of their respective 
isolations—Lisa in her sheer ordinariness, and Michael in his solipsism. For both of characters, 
this connection is a necessary (if ersatz) reprieve. And, flimsily justified though their connection 
may be, it nevertheless provokes a real change in Michael’s disposition. Whereas for the first 
                                                
37 Massumi, PV, 25. 
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half of the film, Michael is curt and rude to everyone he encounters, meeting Lisa prompts his 
first gestures of kindness and generosity. The positivity of their brief connection hinges on a 
celebration of difference; Michael is fascinated by everything that individuates Lisa, while she 
herself is enormously moved by the feeling that someone finally appreciates her for who she is. 
  
Fig. 7: Michael and Lisa’s sex scene Fig. 8: Michael’s return to solipsism the following morning. 
In a nightmare sequence directly following the sex scene, hordes of homogenous 
Noonan-voiced hotel employees urge Michael to leave Lisa: “Have it with anyone at all, 
anybody, just not Lisa. [...] We’re all here for you. We’re all one for you.” He runs to his room to 
find Lisa, telling her that “Everyone is one person but you and me. You're the only other person 
in the world! [...] We need to stay together. Forever.” When Lisa asks about his wife and son, he 
replies that “They don’t exist. They’re just them.” The urgency of Michael’s pleas suggests a 
deep connection between physical differentiation and meaningful emotional interaction, 
particularly his final collapsing of the distinction between not being unique and not existing. That 
he is only able to put his delusion into words (“You’re the only other person in the world!”) after 
a cathartic physical connection with another person substantiates Buck-Morss’ and Massumi’s 
models of the links between sensation, perception, affect and emotion—models which 
necessitate a corporeal a “starting point” for experiences that attain linguistic significance in the 
mind’s semiotic machinery. Escaping from anaesthesia requires the ability to see (and feel) 
people for what distinguishes them from everybody else—what makes them anomalous. 
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What Michael doesn’t realize is that seeing things this way is a choice. After he wakes up 
from his nightmare, he has breakfast with Lisa while they make plans for a life together. But as 
their conversation progresses, Lisa’s mannerisms (talking with her mouth full, clicking her teeth 
against her fork, etc.) begin to get on Michael’s nerves. To to his horror, Lisa’s voice begins to 
change, and soon her lines, too, are delivered by Tom Noonan. As Michael realizes what is 
happening, the camera slowly realigns itself with his point of view. In the foreground, the back 
of Michael’s head fills half the frame, while Lisa evaporates in the background due to shallow 
focus and the blinding light of the sun behind her (Fig. 8). Crowded and divided into distinct 
spatial planes, the composition of this shot directly contrasts the deep-focused wide shots of the 
sex scene, which at once gave Michael and Lisa a bit of space and allowed them to share it. As 
soon as Michael begins to notice Lisa’s less appealing differences, the camera slips right back 
into his head. For an anaesthetized solipsist, happiness, too, is fugitive. 
In the following scene, Michael gives his (anti)climactic customer-service speech. In the 
wake of Lisa’s assimilation into the homogeneity of his mind, Michael lays out a set of 
guidelines for empathy: “Remember that everyone has a body,” he says halfheartedly, “Each 
body has aches.” But Michael repeatedly begins to speak extemporaneously about how difficult 
it is for him to follow these rules. “What is it to ache?” he asks. “What is it to be alive? I don’t 
know. I don’t know.” In counterpoint to his tender moment of physical contact with Lisa (and 
perhaps because of its rapid dissolution), Michael abruptly describes his emotional state as 
“need[ing] tears” to “tear [him] in two and let this nightmare escape,” saying that it’s “like not 
being able to come.” His unambiguous description of his emotional state as not productive (an 
inability to cry or come) and not pain (he doesn’t know “what it is to ache”) further emphasize 
the “nonfeltness” of his affective anaesthesia, while his vivid assertion of the need for physical 
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catharsis via sex or violence underscores the accumulated frustration of his senselessness. The 
film cuts away from his speech before he can finish. 
* 
 As Lisa’s bad table manners transform her into “everyone else” before Michael’s eyes, 
she optimistically reflects on the new direction her life seems to be taking: “Things can work 
out,” she says. “That’s the lesson.” Michael, who seems to have already made up his mind to 
leave her, avoids eye contact and suggests that “sometimes there’s no lesson. That’s a lesson in 
itself.” Michael may not have learned anything from his encounter with Lisa, but his inability to 
do so illustrates the stakes of the discourse connecting cognitive and bodily affective phenomena. 
Michael’s anaesthesia emphasizes the importance of “links” between physiological and 
psychological processes, theorized as “function-meaning interloops” by Massumi38 and as a 
“sensory circuit” by Buck-Morss.39 Whereas Inside Out relies on structural and architectural 
metaphors to depict a cognitive “headquarters” distinct from Riley’s body, these images of 
“loops” and “circuits” imply a continual and reciprocal interaction between mental and corporeal 
processes that challenges “interest motivator” affect theories in which emotions “drive” an 
ancillary and mechanized body. By literalizing and foregrounding this mechanization through its 
metacinematic use of stop-motion puppetry, Anomalisa illustrates the consequences of a life 
lived in the head, far from the sensory boundaries that constitute the first step in the process of 
generating affect. As a result, Michael is anaesthetic, a-sensory, and the oppressive homogeneity 
of his perceptions is transposed onto the world around him through the film’s meticulous control 
of the malleable animated mise en scène. 
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Fig. 9: Lisa, homogenized in Michael’s perception, and Fig. 10: Lisa at the end of the film. 
In the sense that Anomalisa’s thesis about the relationship between embodiment and 
fulfilling affect goes beyond Michael’s ability to take a “lesson” away from his brief connection 
with Lisa, the film presents a cautionary tale about the effects of an imbalance between mind and 
body—between head and heart, per Massumi’s formulation. In its final moments, the film offers 
a brief glimpse beyond the ambiguous perspective that has slipped in and out of Michael’s mind 
for almost ninety minutes. Leaving his hypothetical life with Lisa in Cincinnati, Michael goes 
home to his unhappy, identical family. He sits at the bottom of the stairs in his house after an 
argument with his wife, and the camera pulls away as he stares ahead with an expression of 
resigned aporia. In a more traditionally structured narrative, the film would fade to black, 
emphasizing the tragedy of Michael’s inability to change. Instead, Anomalisa offers a coda: Lisa 
rides back home in her friend’s convertible, writing in her journal. And though she was 
thoroughly homogenized in Michael’s perception by the time he gave his speech (fig. 9), in the 
film’s final shot her face and voice are her own. The wind blows back her hair, revealing the scar 
that she self-consciously covers with her bangs throughout the film, and she looks ahead with an 
expression of contentment (fig. 10). Though Michael is himself unable to recognize and 
overcome his affective shortcomings, his momentary and perhaps ill-intentioned effort to start an 
affair with Lisa at least gives her the physical positivity and self-worth she needs to look forward 
to the rest of her life again. “I’m sorry to see you go,” she writes, “but I understand. Well, I don’t 
understand, but I accept it.” 
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* 
If, in Being John Malkovich, the “sum total” of puppet-Abelard’s love consists of the 
“wretched pleasures” he takes in his lustful thoughts of Heloise, Michael Stone’s assimilation 
and objectification of everyone he meets represents a different kind of “wretched pleasure”: not a 
feverish longing for an absent love, but a selfish erasure of difference, a refusal to see people for 
anything other than their capacity to please him. And just as puppet-Heloise’s “thoughts are 
betrayed by the movement of [her] body,” the foregrounded objectification of the film’s puppet 
bodies “betrays” Michael’s thoughts in two senses of the word. For one thing, it exposes his 
solipsistic treatment of everyone around him by functioning as a metaphor for his limited and 
selfish perception. But the film’s bodies also conflict with his efforts to grapple with his 
“insensible” emotional state, as literal diegetic objects that exacerbate his isolation. 
Through its slippages between subjective and objective points of view, its visual and 
narrative motifs of “spreading thin,” and its foregrounding of the themes of aporia and 
corporeality, Anomalisa creates a narrative and textual “feeling” that eludes its protagonist’s 
apprehension. Through its use of stop-motion to deindividuate and mechanize the bodies of its 
characters, the film foregrounds the link between corporeal and cognitive processes in generating 
affect, affirming recent theoretical imperatives to think of affect as a mingling of mind and body. 
Inside Out illustrated the necessity of pliable and continually adapting strategies, but stopped 
short of engaging with the cinematographic ambiguities required to depict affect as a co-
constitutive physiological and psychological phenomenon. Strident in its diegetic blends and 
blurs, Anomalisa takes on this challenge, illustrating the importance of sensory engagement in 
generating affect through the cautionary tale of a man who fails to strike the proper balance 
between mind and body. In my final chapter, I’ll show how Hayao Miyazaki’s Spirited Away 
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complicates the theoretical imperative to think corporeally by demonstrating the adverse effects 
of received aesthetic values that condition our cognitive assessment of bodily experiences. 
*
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An Encyclopedia of Embodiment: 
Spirited Away’s Aesthetic-Affective Paradigm Shift 
 
 At the 2003 Academy Awards, Hayao Miyazaki’s Spirited Away beat out four films 
produced by Disney and Dreamworks to win the Oscar for Best Animated Feature. After nearly 
three decades of making complex, feminist, environmentally conscious films, Miyazaki exploded 
into the western cinematic imagination, earning a lucrative Disney distribution deal with DVD 
introductions from Disney “Chief Creative Officer” John Lasseter. But Spirited Away perplexed 
western audiences; in the wake of the “Disney Renaissance” that produced sumptuous 
traditionalist films like The Little Mermaid, Beauty and the Beast, and The Lion King, where was 
the place for this lush yet terrifying film about a girl whose parents are transformed into pigs 
onscreen, about a masked, translucent ghost who eats people and steals their voices?1 Some were 
quick to identify an allegory for human trafficking: a young girl is forced to work in a bathhouse, 
losing her name in the process—pretty straightforward. But where did such a grown-up 
“cartoon” fit in? In his 2002 review for Salon, Andrew O’Hehir wrote that “to those who want to 
ask practical questions, such as whether ‘Spirited Away’ is an appropriate movie for children, I 
have no answers. Arguably it isn’t an appropriate movie for anybody.”2 
But despite Spirited Away’s apparent challenges to the genre codification of the 
American box-office, Miyazaki’s films tend to function according to the same realist principles 
that helped Disney corner the market. That is to say that he essentially uses the frame as a 
                                                
1 A brief anecdotal indulgence: Just about everyone I know who saw this film for the first time around the 
age of six remembers stopping about fifteen minutes in because this sequence was so frightening. Many 
of them, myself included, steered clear of Miyazaki’s films for years because of the visceral horror of 
watching Chihiro’s parents transformed and taken away from her. 
 
2 Andrew O’Hehir. “Spirited Away.” Salon. September 25, 2002. 
http://www.salon.com/2002/09/25/spirited. 
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camera lens; while the contents of the frame are often otherworldly and fantastical, 
“plasmaticness,” the forcing of “representational forms to behave as a non-volitional play of free 
lines and surfaces,”3 is limited—the film’s laws of physics are clear and consistent. 
As I discussed in my chapter on Inside Out, much has been made of Disney’s decision to 
forgo animation’s more abstract capacities in favor of approximating live-action visual 
storytelling. Paul Wells writes that although the Silly Symphonies series and Mickey cartoons 
were often characterized by the “rubber hose” aesthetic of early animation, Disney sensed that in 
order to fully legitimize the medium it would be necessary to adopt the grammar of mainstream 
cinema. “In moving towards the imperatives of live action and populist utopianism of his 
narratives,” he writes, “[Disney] was responding to what he believed was a perceived need in an 
audience and in the commercial context in which he wished to make his films.”4 This meant 
moving toward the feature-length format with Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937) and 
developing a house style that would come to be known as “plausible impossibility”: animators 
created fantastical images (a flying elephant: impossible) that nevertheless followed strict 
internal rules (he has to flap his ears: plausible).5 
The cinematographic principle of Disney’s films bears heavily, if somewhat obliquely, on 
Japanese animation’s visual paradigm. The anime style coalesced during a process of market 
consolidation with striking similarities to the industrialization of American animation under 
Disney and his competitors. While in the 1930s the Disney and Fleischer studios adopted a 
Fordist assembly-line model of animation that simultaneously fractured and collectivized the 
                                                
3 Eisenstein, ED, 99. 
 
4 Wells, AA, 39. 
 
5 Walt Disney. “The Plausible Impossible” [Disneyland episode]. Directed by William Beaudine and 
Wilfred Jackson. (1956; Burbank, CA: Disney Home Video, 2001), DVD. 
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process of making films, the Japanese government began to commission propaganda cartoons to 
bolster morale during the early days of the Fifteen Years’ War. “In 1941,” writes animation 
historian Marco Pellitteri, “the Propaganda Department [...] consolidated [small animation 
companies] into larger corporations, which resulted in the coordination of production” and laid 
the groundwork for the development of what would become an enormous industry.6 The films 
produced in this era, many of which were lost in the aftermath of the war, frequently contained 
thematic and stylistic responses to American cartoons, by that time already world-famous and 
nearly universally recognizable; a 1930 film called Sky Eagles, for example features an aerial 
battle in which Japanese pilots shoot at clouds shaped like Popeye the Sailor and enemy planes 
flown by conspicuously round-eared mice.7 
 The consolidation and assimilation of Japan’s animation industry was further solidified 
under strict American oversight during the military occupation following the Second World War. 
Jonathan Clements argues that “several animators in the post-war period successfully carried the 
skills and know-how of the animators of the Fifteen Years War through the lean times of the 
Occupation, in order to create a firm base of talent and labor.”8 The financial hardships of these 
“lean times” were coupled with the influence of an occupying force with a vested interest in 
promoting a positive image of American culture. Clements describes one director’s decision to 
insert a sequence featuring a dancing Pinocchio into an otherwise naturalistic film, suggesting “a 
deliberate attempt to ingratiate the animators to the American censors.”9 The anime industry 
                                                
6 Marco Pellitteri and Lisa Maya Quaianni Manuzzato, “Japan,” in Animation: A World History, ed. 
Giannalberto Bendazzi (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016): 180. 
 
7 Jonathan Clements, Anime: A History (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013): 56. 
 
8 Ibid., 74. 
 
9 Ibid., 76. 
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developed its signature visual style during this time, in large part due to the influence of animator 
and manga artist Osamu Tezuka, whose enormously popular Astro Boy series (1952-68) placed 
joint stylistic and economic demands on his competitors. Rayna Denison argues that Tezuka’s 
cost-saving “limited animation” model and his tendency to sell individual Astro Boy episodes for 
less than their production cost (in hopes of making a profit on merchandise) made it necessary 
for other animators and studios to adopt similar methods and, consequently, a similar style.10 
This visual style, in which Hayao Miyazaki was trained and in which he has worked for 
the last half-century, blends the Disney style’s diegetic principle of “plausible impossibility” 
with Japanese cultural sensibilities as well as a heightened emphasis on photorealistic 
verisimilitude. Crucially, anime tends to operate with similarly restricted levels of plasmaticness 
and cartoonal play. Magical creatures abound, body proportions and facial expressions are 
exaggerated and distorted, and characters can fly, but everything in the frame essentially obeys a 
common set of physical laws. So rather than using animation for its abstract expressionist 
capacity, Miyazaki’s modus operandi since his 1983 sci-fi eco-parable Nausicaä of the Valley of 
the Wind has been to use the medium to tell stories that live action cannot—like a battle between 
warring drought-stricken tribes and hordes of enormous Argus-eyed insects—and to do so as 
realistically as possible. By 2002, Miyazaki had already noted the encroachment of CGI into his 
mode of storytelling; asked about that year’s Spider-Man, he told Roger Ebert that “in a way 
now, live action is becoming part of that whole soup called animation [...] and my animation is 
just a little tiny dot over in the corner.”11 If the recent string of live-action/CG hybrid remakes of 
                                                
10 Rayna Denison, Anime: A Critical Introduction (London: Bloomsbury, 2015): 79-80. 
 
11 Roger Ebert. “Hayao Miyazaki Interview.” Roger Ebert. September 12, 2002. 
http://www.rogerebert.com/interviews/hayao-miyazaki-interview. 
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classic animated films (The Jungle Book, Beauty and the Beast, Ghost in the Shell) is any 
indication, studios have caught on to this trend. 
All of this is to say that Spirited Away occupies the intersection of several artistic and 
commercial impulses. And just as its grown-up themes and frightening visuals challenge the 
genre classification system in part established by its own Disney realist paradigm, Spirited 
Away’s narrative of personal empowerment in the face of overwhelming threat and physical 
ugliness subverts the traditional aesthetic paradigms that presuppose a link between the two; that 
is, between ugliness and threat. For if, as I argued in my last chapter, animation links sensation, 
affect, and cognition through aesthetic slippages between subjective experience and quasi-
objective mise en scène, Spirited Away’s narrative of aesthetic encounters contextualizes such 
slippages as part of a received—and changeable—system of ethical and corporeal values. The 
links between Chihiro’s initial frightened paralysis and her sensory confrontations with (and 
interpretations of) the bodies she encounters throughout the film show how Miyazaki provides an 
alternative to exclusionary aesthetic principles predicated on a rejecting the body, paving the way 
for a more inclusive system based on shared materiality and mutual vulnerability. 
To illustrate Chihiro’s aesthetic paradigm shift, I’ll begin by showing how Miyazaki uses 
the basic tools of cinema to link her point of view (and emotional state) with her external 
circumstances and sensory encounters. With this in mind, Chihiro’s terrified inactivity arises 
from her aesthetic “readings” of the grotesquely rendered bodies at Yubaba’s bathhouse, whose 
“ugly” corporeal excesses initially signify evil and threat—a reaction in line with centuries of 
aesthetic theory on the topic of disgust. Through analyses of the film’s major set pieces—
encounters with Kamaji, the “stink spirit,” and No-Face—I’ll show how, by reclaiming her 
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agency through work (which more often than not requires physical contact with these bodies), 
Chihiro leaves exclusion behind and develops a celebratory aesthetic paradigm. 
* 
 Like Anomalisa, Spirited Away’s visual style capitalizes on animation’s slippages 
between subjective and objective points of view, necessitating a hybrid interpretive strategy for 
reading the bodies in the film. On the one hand, Miyazaki’s essentially photorealist mode 
foregrounds his use of traditional cinematographic techniques like blocking, character 
performances, and camera movement as affective and narratological tools. Spirited Away’s 
opening image, a first-person close-up of a bouquet of flowers and a goodbye card from 
Chihiro’s friends, is one of a handful of explicitly perspectival images that punctuate the film. 
These moments, few and far between, serve the dual purpose of anchoring the film’s largely 
third-person diegesis in the subjective experiences of its protagonist and foregrounding the fact 
that she, too, has to make sense of the unfamiliar and dreamlike forms she encounters. So while 
Miyazaki opts almost exclusively for an “outside-in” mode of storytelling, these periodic 
reminders of Chihiro’s point of view indicate a space within his realist system for questions of 
interpretation and aesthetic evaluation. All of this would be possible in any live-action film. 
 On the other hand, viewers must also keep close by the principle that nothing in an 
animated film draws itself—every image necessitates artistic decisions. Qua animation, this 
means that we have to pay attention to everything that Miyazaki does and does not include in the 
frame, and how. These questions are particularly pertinent when it comes to character design; 
from the start of the film, Miyazaki subtly develops a visual system linking intricate detail 
(particularly lighting) with feelings of fear and disgust. When Chihiro and her parents stumble 
upon an abandoned amusement park after taking a wrong turn on the way to their new house, 
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they follow their noses to a food stand with enormous, mysteriously abundant plates of steaming 
food. Despite Chihiro’s reservations, her parents begin to piles plates with fat, shiny dumplings, 
plump birds and other pieces of meat; “Daddy’s got credit cards and cash,” her father explains 
through a mouthful of food. The shot is composed as a medium close-up of Chihiro’s parents 
sitting beneath the restaurant counter’s awning, lit from behind as they devour the greasy food 
that glistens on their plates (fig. 1). The detailed lighting in the foreground, which emphasizes 
the curves and protuberances of her parents’ bodies, contrasts with the simpler, flatter lighting on 
Chihiro in the background. 
 Miyazaki’s variable commitment to detail, a visual mode I’m calling “selective 
photorealism” becomes a consistent strategy throughout the film, not only for drawing the eye to 
important characters, but also for highlighting their corporeality. When, despite Chihiro’s 
protests, her parents continue shoveling food into their mouths, unsettling changes begin to 
occur: the sun starts to set as a cloud of steam fills the enclosed stall, further emphasizing the 
contrast of the low incandescent lights. Chihiro urges her parents to leave, but they only hunch 
further over their food as their mastications grow louder and fleshier. Other stalls and buildings 
turn on their electric lights, and shadows begin to move around the edges of the frame. Chihiro 
finally approaches her parents, now surrounded by piles of reddish-brown food waste, to 
physically pull them away from the restaurant. But when her father turns to face her, Chihiro lets 
out a scream: he has transformed into an enormous pig. By this time, the lighting effect from the 
beginning of the scene has intensified; Chihiro’s pig-parents’ bodies bulge irregularly with 
ripples of flesh, clothes pulled taut with strain to contain their lumpy, shimmering skin (fig. 2). 
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Fig. 1: Chihiro watches her parents eat, and Fig. 2: Chihiro’s parents, transformed into pigs 
The images of overflowing flesh and waste in this sequence evoke Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
formulation of the grotesque, whose “artistic logic [...] ignores the closed, smooth, and 
impenetrable surface of the body and retains only its excrescences (sprouts, buds) and orifices, 
only that which leads beyond the body’s limited space or into the body’s depths.”12 Whereas 
Chihiro’s gangly limbs and oversized clothes emphasize her smallness and fragility, making her 
an essentially malleable and plastic element of the frame (see, for example, the way her parents 
crowd her into the middle third of the frame in figure 1), her parents’ bodies spill outward, 
transgressing their limits to reach “beyond [their] limited space.” Miyazaki’s use of selective 
photorealism in this sequence highlights Chihiro’s parents’ grotesque bodies as both sources and 
objects of revulsion. Their lumpy, filmy glow, which contrasts with the smooth aesthetics of 
Chihiro’s simpler design, might be interpreted as either the sensory stimulus that provokes her 
disgust or a slightly exaggerated depiction of her perception of her parents. In the same way that 
Anomalisa’s bland hotel hallways and taxicabs could be read as both reflective and constitutive 
of Michael Stone’s heady anaesthesia, the sticky-looking lighting on Chihiro’s pig-parents is 
both a representation of and a catalyst for her fright. 
Chihiro’s parents’ transformation illustrates the way Miyazaki explores the extremes of 
character design; like the selective detail in their transformation into pigs, every visual element 
                                                
12 Bakhtin, RW, 317. 
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of an animated body is a deliberate representational choice. Chihiro will encounter a great 
number of bodies during her time at the bathhouse (a collection of bouncing yellow-green heads, 
a coterie of ducks who wear leaves as hats, etc.), enormously diverse in their shapes, sizes, colors 
and levels of anthropomorphism—and in their accordance with traditional notions of physical 
beauty. And though Chihiro gradually learns how to reconcile these “ugly” external forms their 
complex and benevolent interiority, her initial encounters are purely sensory. In a way, Chihiro’s 
default interpretive strategy evokes Eugenie Brinkema’s “radical formalist” approach for 
gleaning affect from images, a method that involves “de-privileging models of expressivity” by 
de-coupling external formal qualities from ideas of interiority.13 Reading the grotesque corporeal 
surfaces of the frogs, ducks, and other spirits she meets, Chihiro interprets the “formal 
structures” of their bodies as signifying evil and threat. 
 Chihiro’s affective response to the aesthetic encounters at the beginning of the film is a 
frightened paralysis, a disruption of her agency (in this case, her ability to even move) that 
isolates her from the film’s growing cast of characters, even as the creatures demonstrate a 
generosity that contradicts Chihiro’s misreading of their bodies. After her parents’ 
transformation, Chihiro flees, sprinting back in the direction of the car but finding herself instead 
at the bank of an impossibly wide river. Lost without her parents and terrified by the strange and 
indeterminate creatures she saw at the amusement park, Chihiro freezes in place and curls into 
the fetal position. This gesture, a way of minimizing the vulnerable physical surface of her body 
area, is Chihiro’s first line of defense against the overwhelming stimuli of the Spirit World. 
                                                
13 Brinkema, FA, 37. Although I do want to acknowledge that there’s a difference between Chihiro’s 
surface misreading and Brinkema’s deliberate departure from an affect model linked to interiority. 
Brinkema’s rejection of “expression” reveals her commitment to a model of affect not dependent on a 
cognitively-enabled subject. 
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“It’s just a dream, it’s just a dream,” she says, pounding her forehead with her palms. But 
to no avail: as she rocks back and forth, her body becomes translucent, revealing the flagstone 
path beneath her feet. Then, frightened by the approach of a riverboat filled with hooded spirits, 
she flees to hide behind a building, rubbing her hands together in an attempt to preserve her 
materiality. As she sinks to the floor, a young man in traditional Japanese robes approaches. 
Placing his hands on her vanishing shoulders (fig. 3), he implores her to eat a small red bean, 
sternly telling Chihiro “you have to eat some food from this world, or else you’ll disappear.” She 
swallows the bean, and gradually her body becomes opaque again. But when she tries to stand, 
she finds that she can’t move her legs. Haku, the boy who’s come to help her, quickly casts a 
spell to bring her back to her feet and leads her to the bathhouse where she must take residence 
for survival. 
  
Fig. 3: Haku comforts a vanishing Chihiro, and Fig. 4: Kamaji, the bathhouse’s six-armed boilerman 
Chihiro’s near-disappearance foregrounds both the importance of embodiment in the 
film’s narrative logic and the centrality of Chihiro’s own materiality to her subjective feelings of 
security and comfort. Though her first instinct in the presence of danger is to modulate the 
boundaries of her physical interaction with the world by making herself as small as possible, the 
threat of completely losing her concrete physical interface sends Chihiro into a panic. It’s only 
through the act of physical consumption that she is able to ground herself at the material level 
and experience a brief moment of relief: “I’m okay,” she says as she presses her fingertips 
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against Haku’s palm. As with Anomalisa’s Michael Stone and Inside Out’s Riley, Chihiro’s 
physical needs—to eat, to touch—bring her down to earth from the whirling head-space of 
anxiety and panic. 
If affect is essentially, as Rei Terada describes it, “the interpretation of predicaments,” 
Chihiro’s incapacitated response to her frightening new circumstances reveals a link between her 
interpretive strategies and her ability to do something about her situation.14 Chihiro’s 
circumscribed agency, her terrified immobility and passivity in the face of overwhelming 
circumstances and stimuli, evokes Spinoza’s formulation of affectus: Chihiro’s limited “potentia 
agendi,” or “capacity to act,” reflects the simultaneous sensory and cognitive impacts of her 
arrival in the Spirit World.15 Her paralysis is both a physical and an emotional state. 
If this paralysis can thus be conceived as a “feeling” in the sense that it is both a sensory 
and cognitive response to Chihiro’s interaction with the world, it undoubtedly qualifies, per 
Ngai, as an ugly feeling. Certainly negative in its close connection with ugliness and physical 
threat, Chihiro’s paralysis also exemplifies the crucial quality of unproductiveness, in the sense 
that fear prevents her from working.16 Just as Michael Stone’s solipsistic “anaesthesia” impeded 
his much-needed emotional (and physical) catharsis, Chihiro’s inability to take action at the start 
of the film inhibits both her physical safety, dependent on her ability to make herself useful at the 
bathhouse, and her emotional well-being, dependent on connection with the other characters in 
the film. When Haku first arrives and attempts to help Chihiro by giving her the red bean, she 
initially shuts her eyes and attempts to shove him away—only to press her evanescent arms 
                                                
14 Rei Terada, Feeling in Theory: Emotion After the “Death of the Subject” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 57. 
 
15 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, vol. III, definition 3. 
 
16 Ngai, UF, 2. 
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straight through his body. Most of Chihiro’s interactions with new characters play out in much 
the same manner: scared to respond, she only speaks when her silence provokes outward 
frustration (in the case of Yubaba, the macrocephalic witch who owns the bathhouse) or pity (in 
the case of Lin, a persnickety but kindhearted employee who takes Chihiro on as an apprentice). 
But paralysis is anathema to the demands of the bathhouse, where constant physical 
labor—often requiring close proximity to or contact with the Spirit World’s myriad bodies—is 
the sole condition of Chihiro’s residency. Like Chihiro’s run-ins with her pig-parents and the 
shadowy spirits in the amusement park, each unique body in the film presents an aesthetic 
encounter. The extraordinary sensory characteristics (shape, texture, sound, smell) of these 
creatures highlight the dual sense of “aesthetics” undergirding Chihiro’s affective responses: as 
pertaining to the subjective affectus of Chihiro’s beleaguered sensorium, but also to the received 
system of beauty-related moral judgments that structure her interpretation of the world; the latter 
here designated “categorical aesthetics” as a way of keeping the two straight. 
Chihiro’s paralysis grows out of a traditional aesthetic system predicated on a body-mind 
moral hierarchy that codifies the exclusion of intolerable corporeality as disgust. As a relay point 
between the fields of affect and aesthetics, disgust reveals the links between our sensory 
experiences and the evaluative structures that inflect our affective responses—and illustrates how 
subjective “interpretations of predicaments” might reflect broader collective priorities. Writing at 
the dawn of the affective turn, William Ian Miller begins his 1997 Anatomy of Disgust with a 
focus on individual experience: “[Emotions] give the world its peculiarly animated quality; they 
make it a source of fear, joy, outrage, disgust, and delight. They can also de-animate the world 
by making it a cause for boredom and despair.”17 Whereas Spinoza’s formulation of affect as the 
                                                
17 William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 8. 
Hereafter AD. 
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“changing potential to act” emphasizes the body as the passive object of interactions with the 
world, Miller makes emotions the grammatical subject. They “animate” the world, structuring 
our perceptions through the outward projection of subjective dispositions, as in the case of Inside 
Out’s color-coded memory orbs. And while Spinoza’s and Miller’s directional disagreement may 
appear to set them at odds,18 it also reveals the interplay (and occasional competition) between 
impulses that condition our understanding of the world—sensory and categorical aesthetics. 
As Chihiro illustrates, the fear of sensory interaction is central to Miller’s formulation of 
disgust, which he says “evokes the sensory experience of what it feels like to be put in danger by 
the disgusting, of what it feels like to be too close to it, to have to smell it, see it, or touch 
it.”19But he also describes disgust’s social and evaluative qualities, identifying “disgust rules” 
that “proclaim the meanness and inferiority of [their] subject[s].”20 Brinkema contextualizes 
Miller’s  emphasis on the role of abjection—literally the “throwing away” of the intolerable—as 
part of a centuries-long philosophical effort to “moderate pleasure through the notion of an 
unlimited or infinite reflection.”21 Fearing moral and material excesses (and accepting the 
implicit premise that there is a connection between the two), aesthetic theorists celebrated the 
high-minded pleasures of thought, in hopes of mediating direct corporeal experience through 
reason and classification. Both Brinkema and Ngai note the paradoxical necessity of disgust, an 
“unintegratable aspect” of the structure of aesthetic valuation that nevertheless accompanies the 
                                                
18 Indeed, this disagreement may be the affect theory’s most fundamental split; as Gregg and Seigworth 
see it “there is [...] a certain sense of reverse flow between these lines of inquiry—a certain inside-
out/outside-in difference in directionality: affect as the prime "interest" motivator that comes to put the 
drive in bodily drives (Tomkins); affect as an entire, vital, and modulating field of myriad becomings 
across human and nonhuman (Deleuze).” See Gregg and Seigworth, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” 6. 
 
19 Miller, AD, 9. 
 
20 Ibid. 
 
21 Brinkema, FA, 125. 
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idea of “beauty” wherever it goes.22 Brinkema further problematizes this not-ness, arguing that 
disgust is “a floating signifier of rejection [...] into which anything can be placed to disappear 
into the ravenous hunger of cultural prohibition.”23 Brinkema’s deconstruction reveals disgust to 
be an unstable theoretical strategy for preserving a circumscribed notion of “beauty” by 
tempering sensory engagement with the world and vilifying forms which fail to do so. 
Though the perspectives of the aesthetic philosophers Brinkema problematizes are 
decidedly eurocentric, their formulations of the relationship between otherness and the senses are 
certainly borne out in Chihiro’s particular disgust. As I discussed in the context of Chihiro’s 
parents’ transformation, her fear, disgust, and paralysis are both represented and intensified by 
Miyazaki’s selective photorealist principle. As the film progresses, a few key interactions 
demonstrate the porousness of the boundary between horror, revulsion, and the inability to act. 
These sensory and categorical aesthetic encounters illustrate the tensions outlined by Miller, 
Ngai, and Brinkema in the context of Chihiro’s struggle to reclaim her agency and connect with 
the characters around her. While the scope and danger of these encounters appear to increase 
sequentially, each scene has essentially the same structure: Chihiro is initially frightened into 
paralysis, is forced to take action, and finally realizes that she had never been in all that much 
danger in the first place. Still, her bravery in the face of what she perceives as threatening 
circumstances repeatedly expands her capacity to take on the challenges of her work in the 
bathhouse. By reshaping her paralysis through action, Chihiro develops a more positive potentia 
agendi and re-codes her aesthetic priorities—a paradigm-shift that allows her to remove ugliness 
from the equation and finally connect with the film’s other characters. 
                                                
22 Ibid., 126. 
 
23 Ibid., 132. 
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Kamaji, the bathhouse’s disgruntled, six-armed boilerman, is the first of these encounters. 
After Haku helps Chihiro regain her material body, he instructs her to find the boiler-room and 
ask its operator for work. “If you don’t get a job,” he tells her, “Yubaba will turn you into an 
animal.” Though initially hesitant and frightened at the prospect of being left alone, Chihiro 
eventually follows Haku’s instructions and makes her way to Kamaji. Perched on a wooden 
platform at the center of the room and working away with all six of his arms, the boilerman 
seems not to notice Chihiro as she enters the room. Lit in the same lumpy and highly detailed 
manner as Chihiro’s parents, Kamaji’s spiderlike body, spindly and irregular, demonstrates a 
kind of grotesque excess that differs from their overconsumption (fig. 4). His six gangly arms, 
unsightly “ramifications and offshoots,” flaunt the standard confines of a human body and allow 
him to stretch out in all directions at once.24 They twist, bend, and stretch without any apparent 
muscular or skeletal constraints—one of the only examples of outright “plasmaticness” in the 
film. When Chihiro sees him at work, she shrinks unseen into the corner of the room; eyes half-
closed, hair disheveled, and with a hand over her stomach, her gestural response is somewhere 
between horror and illness. 
Kamaji’s stretchy, expanding form, a callback to an older era of animation, illustrates 
how the medium’s malleable commitment to physical laws allows filmmakers to foreground the 
boundaries of the body. Describing Gertrude, the similarly boneless wife of Infinite Jest’s 
Québecois wheelchair-assassin Marathe, Heather Houser writes that “disgust is a powerful 
strategy for making bodies physical even as it foregrounds the indeterminacy of the body’s limits 
and thus threatens the self.”25 But whereas the inherent vulnerability of Gertrude’s concave, 
plasmatic body threatens her own survival (the narrator likens her head to “a half-filled balloon 
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or empty bag”), Kamaji’s excessive (literally “out-stepping”) rubber-hose indeterminacy is a 
threat to Chihiro’s safety—at least, that’s how she interprets it.26 
Like the skeleton-hand bramble that grabs at the hem of Snow White’s dress as she runs 
through the woods, Kamaji’s eerily flexible arms represent an isolated disruption of the text’s 
internal physical laws, foregrounding not only his own fluid corporeal boundaries but also the 
potential instability of the entire animated world. Borrowing a name from the ecstatic early films 
of Winsor McCay, Scott Bukatman calls the universe of cartoons a “slumberland [...] a space of 
play and plasmatic possibility” characterized by formal fluidity and “playful disobedience.”27 At 
the turn of the 20th century, when animation was still so young a medium that part of the 
spectacle was disbelief that drawings could move in the first place, cartoon characters were 
“disobedient machines,” spirited and self-possessed, but always in the context of their fabrication 
by the animator.28 
But while the Spirit World may qualify as an animated “slumberland” in the sense that it 
is populated by exaggerated, metamorphic, and dreamlike forms, Miyazaki’s storytelling 
strategies endow Chihiro with a sense of subjectivity absent from the films of McCay—this is 
why she is afraid of such seemingly harmless creatures as the Ootori-Sama, a group of giant 
yellow ducks who sometimes wear leaves as hats, and the Radish Spirit, an enormous 
anthropomorphized daikon with whom Chihiro shares an elevator to meet Yubaba (fig. 5). 
Whereas the whimsical cartoon physics of McCay’s films “depend on an understanding of actual 
physics and a conscious decision to ‘play along’ with a world that operates differently,” the 
Spirit World is altogether unconcerned with Chihiro’s understanding of or willingness to follow 
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27 Bukatman, The Poetics of Slumberland, 2. 
 
28 Ibid., 6. 
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the rules.29 When Chihiro strikes her palms against her head and says “I’m dreaming, I’m 
dreaming,” she doesn’t wake up. 
  
Fig. 5: The Radish Spirit, and Fig. 6: Chihiro “smells like a human” 
If the Spirit World exemplifies the possibilities of animation without the playful 
cartoonality traditionally associated with the medium, it also lacks the aesthetic consensus that 
informs Chihiro’s initial reactions to the bodies she encounters. In her analysis of the social-
evaluative dimension that undergirds ugliness judgments, Ngai amplifies Miller’s emphasis on 
disgust’s exclusionary “rules,” arguing that “[disgust] seeks to include or draw others into its 
exclusion of its object, enabling a strange kind of sociability.”30 Trapped in a new place without 
the social bonds of a shared aesthetic paradigm, the ugly underpinnings of Chihiro’s body-
reading strategy are laid bare—and in fact, she herself becomes the object of revulsion for the 
bathhouse’s spirits. As Haku leads Chihiro to the side entrance of the bathhouse, a panic breaks 
out when one character, Yubaba’s frog henchman, hears her breath. Throughout the film, the 
new characters Chihiro meets repeatedly complain that she “smells like a human,” and she is 
routinely relegated to the most onerous and humiliating tasks in the bathhouse (fig. 6). Indeed, if 
disgust is characterized by “a hungry demand for rules of inclusion and exclusion,” the 
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inhabitants of the Spirit World place Chihiro squarely outside their established notions of beauty 
and acceptability.31 
But it is precisely because of Chihiro’s repositioning as the excluded “other” in the Spirit 
World that she is forced to reclaim her agency and rethink her paradigm for interpreting bodies. 
Susan Napier gives Chihiro’s alienness to the bathhouse an ecocritical dimension, arguing that 
“Chihiro herself is initially signified as a polluting alien marked by her human stench but 
gradually she becomes incorporated into the bathhouse collectivity, where she grows in agency 
and maturity.”32 Napier’s emphasis on pollution and collectivity underscores her interpretation of 
the film as an exploration of consumption and cultural exchange. For Napier, the specter of 
global capital looms at the edges of Spirited Away like a masked ghost: while “much of the 
extraordinary visual pleasure of the film comes from [its] [European-Chinese-Japanese] 
amalgam of diverse motifs and images,” the ideology of consumerism as embodied in the film’s 
various grotesque monsters illustrates a “primitive territoriality” in our relations with one another 
and with the planet.33 The selfish fixation on satisfying immediate physical desires (most often 
for food, but also for wealth) without heed to their larger consequences creates “polluted” bodies. 
Clearly, Napier’s suspicion of the pleasures of global capitalist consumption complicates 
my own attempt to problematize aesthetic theories that link moral and physical excesses. While 
on the one hand the insistent materiality of the Spirit World’s inhabitants challenges the “disgust 
rules” of Chihiro’s body-interpretation strategy, the film’s sociocultural and ecocritical agendas 
seems in some part to depend on them. After all, shouldn’t we abhor the needless, epicurean 
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overconsumption that transforms Chihiro’s parents into pigs? Shouldn’t we treat such disregard 
for moderation with some degree of revulsion? 
Perhaps not. Two of Spirited Away’s bodies—those of the “stink spirit” and No-Face—
demonstrate the destructive sublimation of harshly codified aesthetic principles that rely on 
disgust and shame. In both of these encounters, Chihiro’s equanimity and compassion in the face 
of grotesque excess create new avenues for reconciling “ugly” materiality with moderation and 
positive affect. In this way, Chihiro develops an aesthetic system that simultaneously highlights 
our duty to peer and planet and represents excess without codifying grotesque bodies as 
inherently immoral. 
Such an outlook depends, essentially, on a reclamation of the grotesque for its positive 
critical productivity. In Brinkema’s deconstruction of traditional aesthetic systems’ disgust rules, 
she argues that “the affect is a structure organized around a process of exclusion and not a 
content that fills it in or gives it definition, shape, coherence, substance.”34 Brinkema emphasizes 
disgust’s essentially negative quality (that is, its not-ness), asserting its inability to be integrated 
into any aesthetic structure “but a set of itemized disgusting things”: vomit, excess flesh, bodily 
fluids, et cetera.35 This characterization of disgust as essentially non-constructive illustrates the 
problem with aesthetic rules that vilify bad bodily behavior without providing a positive, 
materialist alternative. Thus, in Ngai’s view, “a poetics of disgust would seem incompatible with 
pluralism.”36 She critiques not just its exclusionary and non-structuring qualities, but also its 
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essentially non-celebratory nature. Disgust, then, presupposes a “correct” way to have a body by 
demarcating “the negative limit of [aesthetic] disattendability.”37 
 Chihiro’s first customer at the bathhouse, an enormous mass of green-brown sludge 
called “the stink spirit,” pushes this negative limit (fig. 7). As it approaches the bathhouse, the 
amusement park’s spirits shutter their storefronts and turn out the lights. Yubaba’s employees 
attempt to ward it off by waving lanterns and shouting that the bathhouse is closed, but they faint 
or flee as soon as they’re able to smell the spirit. The stink spirit’s repulsiveness is apparently so 
powerful that it permeates the medium itself. When it gives Chihiro a handful of slimy gold 
coins in exchange for a soak in “the big tub,” her hair literally stands on end as a chill passes 
through her body—a zig-zag pattern that ruffles her drawn outline from bottom to top as her eyes 
expand and her muscles tense up. As Inside Out’s visual shorthand shows, these kinds of 
literalized metaphors are well-treaded ground for animation, a medium defined by the 
transposition of internal feeling onto bodies’ external forms. But as in the case of Kamaji’s 
rubber-hose arms, the infrequency of such slippages into a cartoonal mode makes Chihiro’s 
initial reaction to the stink spirit even more remarkable. The stink spirit’s medium-infecting 
repulsion illustrates Brinkema’s argument that disgust “seems to be [...] an affect bound up with 
bodies, to implant itself without mediation on a skin or a consciousness, to have a direct target in 
the repulsed sensorium of its victim.”38 Brinkema’s emphasis on the power of unmediated 
sensory experience recalls the aesthetic overload that feeds into Chihiro’s paralysis earlier in the 
film—the agency-sapping fear that pushes her into diegetic interstices, into corners, into the fetal 
position. 
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 Spilling outwards and leaving a trail of brown sludge wherever it goes, the stink spirit’s 
body literally exceeds its own boundaries, recalling Houser’s and Bakhtin’s emphases on 
“indeterminacies” which “lead beyond the body’s limited space.” But as horrid as the stink spirit 
may be, Chihiro gradually learns (as do all of the bathhouse’s employees, who watch from the 
balcony) that its grotesque sensory characteristics have little to do with its nature. Overcoming 
the paralyzing force of her disgust, Chihiro wades through the now knee-deep, semi-solid slime 
to pull the lever that will fill the tub with mineral-infused water. Knocked into the tub by the 
stream, Chihiro spots a metal rod sticking out of the side of the spirit’s body, which she pulls out 
with the help of Yubaba’s magic. The rod, it turns out, is the handle of an old, rusted bicycle, the 
first object in a tangled, impossibly large mass of garbage that sprays out into the bathhouse 
atrium, dirtying everything in sight. The so-called “stink spirit,” Yubaba explains, was actually a 
polluted river spirit—and he is still in the bathhouse. After Chihiro discovers a small brown 
dumpling as her reward,39 an incredibly wrinkled mask emerges from the water, bidding Chihiro 
“Well done!” before disappearing from the bathhouse in a shimmering dragon-like jet, 
triumphant laughter echoing in its wake (fig. 8). 
The narrative trajectory of the stink spirit sequence demonstrates how sensory interaction 
through reclaimed agency enables Chihiro to rethink her disgust parameters and engage more 
positively with materiality. Immersion is a key motif for the relations between bodies in this 
scene, as Chihiro’s literal plunge into the polluted material of the river spirit’s body illustrates a 
metaphorical “diving in” to an unprecedented level of sensory engagement and body 
consciousness. Whereas in previous scenes Chihiro froze and shrunk within the frame, allowing 
herself to become a malleable element of the mise en scène in exchange for minimized physical 
interaction, here she deliberately enters a space of unmediated physical contact, submerging 
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herself in the sludge, the bathwater, the grey-brown cascade of consumer waste. When the sound 
of the river spirit’s laughter fades, the entire bathhouse erupts in applause. 
  
Fig. 7: The Stink Spirit, and Fig. 8: The River Spirit 
 As a marker of Chihiro’s bravery as well as her acceptance into the bathhouse, the stink 
spirit sequence is obviously a landmark in her personal journey. But the spirit’s transformation—
particularly its emphasis on the motif of pollution—also has the effect of decoupling physical 
excesses from moral culpability (the river spirit is not to blame for its own pollution), illustrating 
the way that outside forces can simultaneously condition a body’s form and its reception. Napier 
rightly points out the implied causes of the river spirit’s transformation into the grotesque 
monster that arrives at the bathhouse: “Despoiled by modern civilization,” she writes, “the river 
has become a sacrifice to consumer capitalism.”40 Napier’s passive construction, which puts the 
river spirit’s body at the mercy of diffused sociocultural evils, illustrates the destructive power of 
ethical systems predicated on negativity and exclusion. The torrents of garbage that emerge from 
the river spirit’s body are presumably the result of decades of “out of sight, out of mind” 
thinking: it is easier to hide waste beneath the surface of a river than to confront it. Just as 
Michael Stone projects his homogenizing anaesthesia onto Lisa—to the detriment of both of 
them—the stink spirit represents a sublimation of the shame and negativity associated with 
material excess. In this way, the spirit’s shapeless, ever-expanding body is a testament to the 
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failure of traditional aesthetic systems to structure disattendable forms and behaviors as part of a 
positive dialogue. Made “insistent and intolerable” by continual neglect, the chickens have come 
home to roost.41 
* 
If the stink spirit’s revolting appearance tests the utility of a disgust-based poetics by 
making that which “the aesthetic cannot speak” unignorable, Chihiro’s actions pave the way for 
a more compassionate, mindful, and, crucially, realistic approach to the body.42 Elsewhere I have 
made much of Miyazaki’s visual principle of selective photorealism, arguing that his deliberate 
variation in levels of detail allows him to use the mise en scène to simultaneously represent and 
generate affect. But Chihiro’s interaction with the stink spirit prompts an expansion of that 
concept of “realism” to account for the underlying aesthetic principles that motivate 
representational decisions. For, as I explored in my first chapter, animation complicates the 
dichotomy between competing notions of “realism” by necessitating visual compromises 
between truth to form and truth to feeling. 
And while part of what makes animation so amenable to affect theory in the first place is 
their shared resistance to “dialectical reconciliation of cleanly oppositional elements,” (i.e., 
animation can and probably always is true to both form and feeling), thinking in terms of 
compromises can provide useful, if not rigid, strategies for approaching individual texts.43 
Bakhtin exemplifies this somewhat loose theoretical mode in Rabelais and His World, where he 
argues that grotesque corporeal imagery, while differing from the “naturalist picture of the 
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human body,” is nevertheless a fundamentally realist style.44 Just as Miyazaki modulates realism 
through selective inclusion of detail, Bakhtin’s realism is characterized by “exaggeration, 
hyperbolism, [and] excessiveness.”45 Critiquing scholars who previously defined the grotesque 
as the exaggeration of solely inappropriate (or “disattendable,” to use Miller’s term) bodily forms 
and functions, he offers the merry, “carnivalesque” world of Rabelais as an example of the 
grotesque body’s capacity to “degrade”46 lofty, cognitivist aesthetic systems “to the sphere of 
earth and body in their indissoluble unity.”47 Like the stink spirit’s insistent, all-out assault on the 
senses, the realism of Bakhtin’s theory lies in his assertion of the need to incorporate ugly forms 
into an inclusive poetics of the body, rather than execrating them as an inarticulable 
transcendental signified. 
Crucially, Bakhtin writes that “in grotesque realism, the bodily element is deeply 
positive.”48 Whereas traditional disgust poetics rely on a fear of sensory engagement, Bakhtin 
writes that “the [grotesque] images of folk culture are absolutely fearless and communicate this 
fearlessness to all.”49 Chihiro achieves this fearlessness, antithetical to her paralysis, only 
through immersive sensory confrontation with an Other she initially codifies as disgusting and 
threatening. In this way, Bakhtin offers a corrective to the limited and decidedly unrealistic 
disgust-poetics problematized by Brinkema and Ngai—as well as a personal, affective alternative 
for Chihiro. All of this focus on “positivity” is not to say that the film conceives of the stink 
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spirit’s overwhelming and excretory form as “a good thing”; rather, such a paradigm-shift 
emphasizes the both the critically positive dimensions of an essentially inclusive, materialist 
conception of difference (as opposed to the negative “notness” of theories linking excess and 
disgust). If Inside Out demonstrates how animation instantiates Massumi’s “vertical path 
between the head and the heart,” and Anomalisa shows the dangers of an improper balance 
between the two, Spirited Away offers a safeguard against paths and strategies that lead back up 
into the head.50 Following Chihiro’s model, this essentially amounts to a deliberate, moment-by-
moment decision to engage with and interpret bodies generously. 
In the case of the polluted and misunderstood river spirit, this generosity essentially 
amounted to a willingness to read beyond the coded body-interpretation laid out by the exclusive 
aesthetics of disgust. Chihiro’s physical contact with the spirit’s excessive body revealed its 
underlying goodness, highlighting the destructive potential for misreading bodies that 
accompanies a resolute linkage of moral and physical excess. But her next challenge, a masked, 
translucent spirit named No-Face, complicates the enterprise of interpretation writ-large. Initially 
devoid of corporeal qualification, No-Face’s body—and his actions—transform to reflect the 
way that other characters treat him. In this way, he comes to embody the bathhouse’s rampant 
consumption; and as in the case of the stink spirit, it is Chihiro’s willingness to take action that 
brings about No-Face’s eventual redemptive transformation. 
No-Face first appears toward the beginning of the film, lurking in the dark outside the 
bathhouse as Chihiro becomes acclimated to her new environment. Unfamiliar with the aesthetic 
conventions of the Spirit World, Chihiro does not distinguish him from the other strange and 
unfamiliar bodies she encounters. When she first sees him, crossing a bridge on her way to meet 
Haku at the bathhouse’s pigpen (where her parents are being kept), Chihiro bows her head 
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slightly and avoids interaction—though No-Face certainly sees her (fig. 9). But when she 
musters the courage to turn around, the bridge is deserted. 
Translucent and apparently eager to disappear, No-Face is a literal “fugitive presence,” an 
embodiment of the unnerving “illegibility” that Ngai identifies in Melville’s “Bartleby the 
Scrivener.”51 In the opening reading of her theory of “ugly feelings,” she identifies how “the 
interpretive problems posed by [Bartleby’s] affective equivocality” themselves become “sites of 
emotional negativity.”52 But whereas Bartleby’s withholding of labor begs the question, “What, 
if anything, is this inexpressive character feeling,” No-Face prompts a truncated version: What, if 
anything, is this inexpressive character?53 
For one thing, his physical characteristics align fortuitously with the terms Brinkema and 
Ngai use to problematize exclusionary aesthetic systems: lingering at the periphery of the 
bathhouse like a vampire without an invitation, No-Face, like disgust itself, is “a floating 
signifier of rejection, not-ness, exclusion.”54 But this isn’t to say that No-Face is ostracized on 
the same excess-abhorring terms as the stink spirit; rather, as a “signifier of not-ness,” No-Face 
doesn’t fit into a traditional aesthetic system because of his sheer lack of qualification. But as the 
film progresses, it becomes clear that No-Face’s lack of qualities is depends upon his exclusion 
from social interaction. When Chihiro leaves a sliding door open as an offer of respite from a 
thunderstorm, No-Face becomes set on reciprocating her act of generosity. He follows her 
around, repeatedly offering bath tokens with a slight gesture of the hands and a breathy “ah,” his 
only method of communication in his present state. 
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Fig. 9: No-Face when he arrives at the bathhouse Fig. 10: After he begins to eat 
But Chihiro’s busy timetable at the bathhouse prevents her from interacting with No-
Face, and he quickly moves on to other, more self-interested interlocutors. While Chihiro follows 
an injured Haku to Yubaba’s study and discovers that she has used a stolen magical charm to 
enslave him, No-Face finds that by handing out gold, he can earn the attention and adulation of 
everyone who works at the bathhouse—but he also learns from their greediness, and begins to 
gobble them up. With each person he swallows, No-Face’s body grows new lumps, 
protuberances and appendages, without any apparent logical principle: pairs of skinny arms and 
legs, a gap-toothed mouth, a tuft of oily brown hair. Gradually his body becomes more opaque, 
glimmering with the detailed, fatty overflow that repeatedly demarcates disgust and horror 
throughout the film. The silhouettes of his victims float beneath the surface of his inky skin. 
No-Face exemplifies Bakhtin’s assertion that “the grotesque body [...] is a body in the act 
of becoming [...] it is continually built, created, and builds and creates another body.”55 But his 
rabid and horrifying overconsumption also demonstrates how Bakhtin’s body-positive aesthetics 
depends on more than simply the inclusion of grotesque corporeal details. By now it seems clear 
that eating is an act of enormous thematic significance in Spirited Away, both as an insistent 
reminder of corporeality and as a platform for the film’s exploration of consumption and excess. 
After Haku takes Chihiro to see her parents at the pigpen, she shrinks, as usual, into the 
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protective fetal position against a hedgerow. She doesn’t respond to Haku’s words of 
encouragement, but when she takes a bite of the rice cakes he offers her, she begins to cry 
enormous, stylized tears, before breaking down into sobs. Her first productive and essentially 
outward show of emotion since her arrival in the Spirit World, the moment is clearly a minor 
catharsis for Chihiro. Her spirits are immediately lifted in the cut to the next scene, as she bows 
to Haku and thanks him for his assistance. 
Chihiro’s reliance on food as a catalyst for productive emotion and interpersonal 
connection contrasts with the “primitive territoriality” that characterizes other characters’ 
relationship to eating. In No-Face’s case, eating comes to illustrate a perverse reciprocity in his 
interactions with the self-interested residents of the bathhouse; as various spirits bring plates of 
food to No-Face in hopes of receiving a handful of gold, he reflects not their “generosity” but 
instead their greed—by eating them. If the stink spirit revealed the unignorable consequences of 
consumptive excess and shame, No-Face materializes and amplifies the ugly not-ness of 
traditional aesthetic discourses and embodies the ultimate obstacle to Bakhtin’s celebratory 
paradigm. 
As is typical of Miyazaki’s narratives, defeating this final obstacle does not require a 
vanquishing of No-Face himself but rather of the unpleasant drives and impulses that motivate 
him to violence.56 If No-Face’s appearance and actions are a reflection of his treatment at the 
hands of others, Chihiro’s real enemy is thus her own disgust (and that of the others at the 
bathhouse, for whom she sets an example). Having accepted a quest to visit Yubaba’s sister and 
apologize in person for the theft of the magical trinket that enslaves Haku, Chihiro returns to the 
ground floor of the bathhouse to find No-Face—by this point a gigantic, six-legged, bean-shaped 
blob. Hundreds of spirits have lined up with elaborately decorated meals, in hopes of receiving 
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handfuls of gold. But as soon as No-Face learns of Chihiro’s presence, he waddles over to her, 
drooling, and offers her some of the spirits’ food—an enormous bowl full of whole, skinned 
rabbits—as well as some gold. “I’m not giving it to anybody else,” he says in the voice of one of 
his swallowed victims. 
Chihiro responds with equanimity: “I’d like to leave, please. I have someplace I need to 
be. You should go home, too. Don’t you have a place to go?” No-Face’s mask shrinks into his 
purple-black ripples of flesh as he responds, “No. I’m lonely. I’m lonely.” In response to No-
Face’s growing agitation, Chihiro tosses the river spirit’s medicine into his mouth before fleeing 
to the train station to follow through on her quest. No-Face convulses and retches as his body 
reacts to the dumpling, and he barrels after Chihiro as she runs away, vomiting up food, slime, 
and intact bathhouse patrons as he gradually reverts to his original form. 
Chihiro’s refusal to react to No-Face’s grotesque body is itself a positive act, a gesture of 
empathy and generous interpretation that disconnects the aesthetic feedback loop at the root of 
his monstrous form. By “degrading” compassion to the level of the senses (making it material 
instead of purely cognitive), Chihiro demonstrates the “absolutely fearless” quality of Bakhtin’s 
material bodily principle, creating the conditions for the moderated and celebratory system of 
body aesthetics that characterizes the rest of the film.57 
If No-Face’s first transformation demonstrated his inability to resolve an isolating 
negative affect as the excluded “floater signifier” of a problematic poetics of disgust, his 
reversion following Chihiro’s rejection of disgust shows how her aesthetic paradigm-shift 
presents the possibility for healing and renewal. In this sense, he reveals what Bakhtin sees as the 
stakes of grotesque realism, which he asserts is “not a private, egotistic form,” but rather a 
                                                
57 Bakhtin, RW, 39. 
95 
collective celebration of the people.58 Chihiro’s dissolution of her own isolating paralysis 
through engagement at the level of the senses enables her to interact compassionately with 
others, illustrating Bakhtin’s idea that “the grotesque body is not separated from the rest of the 
world. It is not a closed, completed unit.”59 If insistently material bodies are not “closed, 
completed units” in the sense that they exist in constant give-and-take with the outside world, 
they are also not affective closed circuits, in the sense that materiality and sensory engagement 
are prerequisites for productive empathic connection with beings beyond the self. 
For if Inside Out shows how animation elides the “vertical path between head and heart” 
through categorical systems of visual metaphor, and Anomalisa reveals the complications of 
perspectival solipsism as represented by the wholly plastic animated mise en scène, Spirited 
Away provides a set of guidelines for the interpretation of otherness in a way that prioritizes 
materiality as the basis for positive affect. Whereas Michael Stone’s flash-in-the-pan connection 
fizzled out because he never made a choice to see others as unique and meaningfully 
differentiated, Chihiro’s empathic connection depends on a moment-by-moment decision as a 
good thing—and to moderate consumption by engaging with its underlying causes rather than 
simply vilifying its physical consequences. 
*
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Conclusion: 
Emotions Can’t Quit, Genius! 
 
 Two years ago, I sat down in Donna Kornhaber’s office to ask her why she thought 
Adam Elliot’s Brother (1999) had (and continues to have) such a powerful emotional impact. A 
simple, memoiristic reflection on loss told entirely through colorless and nearly static claymation 
tableaus, Brother affects me in a way that I have not yet found the words to describe. Sadness, 
longing, nostalgia? None of the words were quite right, and I wanted to know why. This film, the 
first twenty minutes of Pixar’s Up (2009), the entirety of Isao Takahata’s Grave of the Fireflies 
(1988)—why did they all have a mysterious ability to bypass my affective defense mechanisms 
and cut to the bone? Donna suggested that Brother’s emphasis on minute bodily details—a candy 
store owner’s varicose veins, the narrator’s brother’s bad eye, their father’s paralyzed legs—kept 
it grounded, mundane, close to the viewer’s own corporeal peculiarities (figs. 1-2). 
  
Fig. 1: Brother’s narrator and his sibling, Fig. 2: His father 
This is part of what animation is all about, she told me. You get to stretch things out, 
exaggerate, direct the viewer’s eye. Animators negotiate “reality” to visualize how things feel—
in a way that enriches rather than complicates the concomitant notion of how things “are.” The 
question I asked her that day was the motivating impulse that gradually evolved into this thesis. 
No matter how many films I watch, books I read, or journal entries I write, the intuitive 
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emotional impact of animation only grows more elusive. I carry images with me, every minute of 
every day: a well-behaved No-Face cuts into a slice of cake at the end of Spirited Away (fig. 3). 
Two translucent stick-figures ponder a non-figurative skyscape in Don Hertzfeldt’s World of 
Tomorrow (2015) (fig. 4). I wanted, from the outset, to include these stills in the body of my 
argument. But frankly, I still do not know exactly what it is that they do to me. 
  
Fig. 3: No-Face politely eats a slice of sponge cake Fig. 4: Hertzfeldt’s World of Tomorrow 
 Isn’t this why we write, why we watch films, why we get up in the morning? To try and 
discover what animates us? Around midway through Inside Out, Fear packs a suitcase and 
attempts to escape Riley’s head through the pneumatic tube that inhales color-coded memory 
orbs into the machinery of her mind—with Joy and Sadness gone, Riley’s life has become 
impossible to keep under control. But when the tube activates, Fear finds that it has no effect; it 
pulls at his clothes, but he remains firmly in place at the bottom of the tube. As he looks around 
in disbelief, Disgust rolls her eyes. “Emotions can’t quit, genius,” she says. Fear falls out of the 
tube and walks diffidently back to the control panel. 
 I’m charmed by the notion that a team of emotions sits at a metaphorical control panel in 
my head, pulling levers and turning gears in an effort to make my life as joyful as possible. I like 
the idea of emotion’s autonomy, but that word—like so many others in scholarship on affect—
fills a very different place in the conversation than one might think. For Massumi, affect’s 
“autonomy” refers to its independence from the cognitive systems we use to understand the 
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world and ourselves; by this paradigm, he argues that affect and emotion “follow different logics 
and pertain to different orders.”1 Certainly there are affective phenomena that we can categorize 
and apprehend with language: Joy, Sadness, Anger, Fear and Disgust, for example. But what 
ultimately makes affect “autonomous” is its refusal to be confined to totalizing linguistic 
systems. Massumi’s is just one perspective, of course. But his boisterous and at times flagrantly 
imprecise mode of theorizing at the very least underscores how the more slippery elements of the 
affective relationship between mind and body can undermine claims to theoretical solidity. Over 
time, theorists have learned to make peace with and even thrive amidst the “ever-processual” 
flow of affect’s inherent ambiguities.2 Animation and affect search for concepts and forms that 
work in similar ways, particularly in their efforts to work out the tangled questions of 
embodiment and subjectivity, and the role they have in generating emotion. 
 This thesis argues that animation and affect fulfill each other’s needs: animation’s search 
for a vocabulary that valorizes its unique relation to flux, metamorphosis, the shifting boundary 
between subject and world; affect’s demand for forms that resist structural fixities, that flutter 
freely between conceptual and representational systems. The animated films I’ve explored here 
also raise stakes for our own lives, pointing the way to positive affect through narratives of 
personal and emotional crisis. These issues, like so many others in animation studies and affect 
theory, converge at the relationship between the body and the mind. 
 In the introduction, I argued that animation and affect “resonate” in their shared 
resistance to structural fixities, be they formal or theoretical. The complete representational 
freedom afforded by animation’s plasmatic mise en scène requires filmmakers to strike 
deliberate balances between mimesis and abstraction, circumscribing their depictive capacity in 
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the name of thematic or narrative cohesion. This imperative to adopt visual constraints aligns 
animation with the deliberately tentative methodology that characterizes the writings of a number 
of affect theorists, who mindfully embrace loose critical strategies as a way of engaging with 
questions that defy clean categorical breakdowns. In this sense, animation and affect also share a 
fascination with the permeable boundary between internal and external realities.  
 Pixar’s Inside Out literalizes what Paul Wells terms an “oscillation” between these 
interior and exterior states, visualizing the relationship between body and mind through a crisp 
and meticulously organized system of visual metaphors. Through both its color-coded character 
design and its motifs of architecture and industry, Inside Out exemplifies the way that 
animation’s imperative for stylistic compromise allows filmmakers to engage with challenging 
subjects. And though the film initially appears to shy away from its own shortcomings through 
dysphemistic depictions of forms and concepts that challenge its visual strategy (as well as its 
cognitivist theory of affect), its narrative resolution ultimately arises from a moment of structural 
malleability. In this way, the film makes a pragmatic case for the acts of deliberate 
circumscription that both animation and affect necessitate. 
 Charlie Kaufman and Duke Johnson’s Anomalisa problematizes the depictive and 
theoretical ambiguities that Inside Out gestures toward but ultimately fails to address. Through 
its use of trick cinematography to blend first- and third-person perspectives, the film opts for an 
approach that does not hinge on a clear distinction between “inside” and “out” but rather renders 
them co-constitutive. The film’s obscure diegetic commitment results in a mise en scène that is at 
once representative and constitutive of its protagonist’s interior state: the world of Anomalisa is 
both a metaphor for and a contributing factor to its protagonist’s “insensible” emotions. By 
emphasizing the objectifying and mechanizing effects of stop-motion animation within the 
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context of the film’s ambiguous diegesis, Kaufman and Johnson call attention to the role of the 
senses in generating and constituting affect. Ultimately, the film presents a cautionary tale of the 
negative consequences of an affective “circuit” that strikes an improper balance between sensory 
and cognitive processes. 
 Hayao Miyazaki’s Spirited Away illustrates how the affects and judgments that emerge 
from such mind-body circuits are informed by a received system of aesthetic priorities that 
codifies excessive, “grotesque” bodies as signifiers of disgust. Through strategies that subtly 
align the diegesis with its protagonist’s subjective perception and call attention to the physical 
peculiarities of its characters, the film highlights the acts of bodily interpretation that undergird 
our affective responses to physical circumstances. Though Chihiro initially perceives the 
unfamiliar and transgressive bodies around her as threatening, through sensory engagement she 
gradually adopts a new paradigm predicated on a more positive view of “grotesque” materiality. 
In this way, the film critiques the traditional exclusionary poetics of disgust as a paradigm that 
requires and creates ugliness and disgust, and offers up through Chihiro a more generous system 
of aesthetic values. 
Taken together, these films demonstrate the robustness of animation’s capacity to engage 
with questions of cognition, subjectivity and embodiment, across its enormous diversity of styles 
and techniques. Recognizing the homologies between animation’s representational fluidity and 
affect theory’s demand for flexible methodologies enriches both conversations, giving artists and 
theorists alike a new vocabulary for understanding the relationship between what we think and 
what we feel. 
But what's more, through their formal and narrative features, they articulate a paradigm 
that allows theorists and viewers alike to reconsider where “feelings” come from and how we 
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ought to engage with them. Inside Out, Anomalisa and Spirited Away make crystal clear the 
necessity of being present, not just in our thoughts and intentions, but in every place where our 
bodies intermingle with the world around us. Inside Out encourages us not to sweat the details, 
not to expect or strive for perfection, so long as we're able to adapt to the challenges of the 
present moment and move forward. Anomalisa highlights the need to balance the circuit of mind 
and body—to engage with others attentively, with an eye toward the details that make them 
anomalous. And Spirited Away sets an example of the kindness, generosity and courage it takes 
to approach life this way. 
In both animation’s potential for radical change and affect theory’s emphasis on what 
Gregg and Seigworth term “style[s] of being present,” I have long perceived an imperative to 
live in the moment. For all of the structural and methodological similarities between these 
disciplines, they also share a “blink and you’ll miss it” quality, an emphasis on the temporal flow 
from moment to moment that carries us onward, ever onward. This thesis has been an attempt to 
slip into that flow, into the nowness of the body’s interactions with the world. 
The tools we have developed to understand and represent these interactions—cinema, 
theory, everything else—have helped us to discover, in Michael Stone’s words, “what it is to be 
alive, what it is to be human.” And though some of us, like Lisa, are capable of “not 
understanding, but accepting” the workings of the world, our understanding of the relationship 
between embodiment and subjectivity and emotion is far from complete. In what has become a 
kind of refrain throughout affect theory, Spinoza writes that “no one has yet determined what the 
body can do.”3 Affect, for the originator of the term, is ultimately a question of potential: to act, 
to change the world, to move forward. This thesis has aimed to provide scholars with the tools to 
do just that. Because emotions can’t quit, and neither can we. 
                                                
3 Spinoza, Ethics, vol. III, definition 2. 
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